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CONPLICT; FACILITATOR OR INHIBITOR OF CREATIVE PERFORMANCE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM
A recent review of theory and research regarding the psycho­
logical study of creativity (Golann, 1963) identifies three is­
sues r (a) What is creativity? - the issue of definition and 
criteria; (b) How does creativity occur? - the issue of the 
process viewed teirporally; and (c) Under what conditions is 
creativity manifested? - the issue of environmental conditions 
resulting in necessary personality characteristics. Golann 
points out that a striking feature of the literature in the 
area of creativity is the great diversity of interests, motives, 
and approaches of various investigators. He cites four areas 
of investigation which are most popular: (l) the products of
creative behavior, (2) cognitive processes involved in creative 
behavior, (3) the measurement of creativity, and (i|) personal­
ity dynamics of the creative person. The present study is most 
relevant to the enç>hasis on personality.
The psychological studies which approach the problem of crea­
tivity from a personality viewpoint have often concentrated up­
on the uncovering of personality characteristics of life styles 
of creative individuals. These studies have traditionally con­
trasted creative versus non-creative ^s on such variables as 
self-descriptions, others’ descriptions, personality test per­
formance, life history material, etc. Creative versus non-
1
2creative groups have been selected on the basis of performance 
on creativity tests, ratings of creativity, and nominations of 
individuals of outstanding creativity by a panel of experts in 
a particular field. Examples of the first technique (perform­
ance on creativity tests) include the following: studies of
the relationship between self-description and degree of cre­
ativity (Barron, 19^2, 1958)» a study of the relationship be­
tween preferences for perceiving and dealing with complexity, 
and creativity (Barron, 1953 a)j a study of the relationship 
between aptitude and nonaptitude factors and creativity 
(Guilford, 1957); and studies of the relationship between in­
dependence of judgment (Asch line-judgment situation) and cre­
ativity (Barron, 1953 b, 1961).
Exanç)les of the second technique (ratings of creativity) in­
clude the following: A study of the relationship between
Rorschach performance and creativity (Stein and Meer, 1954) 
and studies of the relationship between life history material 
and creativity (Roe, 1953; Stein, 1956; Oattell, 1959; Mac­
Kinnon, 1961, 1965).
Examples of the third technique (nomination of individuals 
of outstanding creativity by a panel of experts in a particular 
field) include the following: studies involving comparisons of
groups of writers (Welsh, 1959)» artists (Rosen, 1955)» and re­
search scientists (Gough, 1961), with groups not usually con­
ceived as containing highly creative individuals, such as 
groups of unselected adults, business men, and military per­
sonnel .
3Other psychological studies which have also approached the 
problem of creativity from a personality viewpoint, have tend­
ed to concentrate not so much upon the uncovering of personal­
ity characteristics of creative individuals, as upon motiva­
tional factors in creative behavior. Among these studies, two 
dominant viewpoints are apparent. The first attempts to ex­
plain creativity by relating it to earlier unacceptable im­
pulses, while at the same time adhering to a tension-reduction 
theory of motivation. For example, Freud (1930, 19^7), de­
scribed creative behavior as resulting from repression of unac­
ceptable induises and the diversion of libidinal energy through 
sublimation.
The second viewpoint conceives of creativity as something 
which developes as the individual attempts to maximally real­
ize his potential in interaction with his environment. This 
viewpoint neither appeals to earlier impulses, nor holds to a 
tension-reduction explanation. While such a view is in accord 
with the theorizing of Allport (1937), Goldstein (1939), Maslow 
(1954), May (1959), and Schachtel (1959), it is an essential 
part of the theory of Rogers (1959, 1961), who describes the 
primary motivation in creative behavior as "man's tendency to 
actualize himself, to become his potentialities." (1959, P.72).
Freud's and Rogers' theories of creativity also differ sig­
nificantly with regard to the role of conflict in creative be­
havior. Freud's position is that creativity is generated by, 
and facilitated by conflict, whereas Rogers' position is that
4conflict inhibits creativity. In spite of these virtually an­
tithetical positions regarding the role of conflict in creativ­
ity, considerations of both conflict and creativity are inte­
gral parts of their respective theories of personality. And, 
most important, the works of Freud and Rogers contain the most 
specific and testable statements regarding the role of conflict 
in creative behavior.
While there have been many theoretical speculations concern­
ing the role of conflict in creative behavior, the literature 
yields only one attempt to submit this specific problem to em­
pirical test (Vogel, 1968). Other studies (White, 1939; Mun- 
sterberg and Mussen, 1953; Stein and Meer, 1954î Barron, 1957» 
Reid, King, and Wickwire, 1959; McReynolds, Acker, and Pietiia, 
1961; Goertzel and Goertzel, 1962; Golann, 1962; Fried, 1964; 
Maddi and Berne, 196^; Bowers, 1965; Fleischer, 1965; Guenther, 
1966; Zdep, 1966; Tortorella, 1967; Hinton, 1966), did not deal 
specifically with the role of conflict in creative behavior, 
but rather with the relationship between anxiety and creativity, 
frustration and creativity, and psychological adjustment and 
creativity.
It was the purpose of the present study to submit to empir­
ical test, the specific problem regarding the role of conflict 
in creative behavior. Freud's position was that creativity is 
both generated and facilitated by conflict. Rogers' position 
is that conflict inhibits creativity. It was hypothesized, in 
accord with Rogers' position, that conflict would result in dim­
5inished creative performance. It we^ e felt that the soundest 
empirical approach would be to generate conflict experimentally 
in the e:sqperimental group, as opposed to attempting to select 
high and low anxious or conflicted individuals. The latter 
method often results in a contamination of variables, whereas 
the former lœthod tends to circumvent such contamination fac­
tors.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OP CONFLICT IN CREATIVITY 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Theoretical Approaches
Freud
Freud's early writings began a continuing courtship between 
psychoanalysis and artistic creativity. Freud was fascinated 
by poets, artists, and writers, and avidly studied the lives 
of such individuals as Leonardo da Vinci. However, while 
Freud dealt with the phenomenon of creativity in numerous con­
texts, he failed to develop a systematic conceptualization 
about it. Because of this lack of clarity, varied interpre­
tations and formulations may be, and have been, derived from 
his work. It is clear, however, that according to Freud, the 
source of creativity is found in conflict. He drew the fol­
lowing parallel between conflict as the source of neurosis, 
and conflict as the source of creativity:
.•.There is in fact a path from phantasy back 
again to reality, and that is - art. The artist has 
also an introverted disposition and has not far to 
go to become a neurotic. He is one who is urged on 
by instinctual needs which are too clamorous. He 
longs to attain to honor, power, riches, fame, and 
the love of women; but he lacks the means of achiev­
ing these gratifications. So, like any other with 
an unsatisfied longing, he turns away from reality 
and transfers all his interest, and all his Libido 
too, to the creation of his wishes in the life of 
phantasy, from which the way might readily lead to 
neurosis. There must be many factors in combination 
to prevent this becoming the whole outcome of his 
development; it is well known how often artists in 
particular suffer from partial inhibition of their cap-
acities throu^ neurosis. Probably their con­
stitution is endowed with a powerful capacity for 
sublimation and with a certain flexibility in the 
repression determining the conflict. But the way 
back to reality is found by the artist thus: He
is not the only one who has a life of phantasy; 
the intermediate world of phantasy is sanctioned 
by general human consent, and every hungry soul 
looks to it for comfort and consolation. But to 
those who are not artists the gratification that 
can be drawn from the springs of phantasy is very 
limited; their inexorable repressions prevent the 
enjoyment of all but the meagre daydreams #iich 
can become conscious. A true artist has more at 
his disposal. First of all he understands how to 
elaborate his daydreams, so that they lose that 
personal note which grates upon strange ears and 
becomes enjoyable to others; he knows too how to 
modify them sufficiently so that their origin in 
prohibited sources is not easily detected. Further, 
he possesses the mysterious ability to mould his 
particular material until it expresses the ideas of 
his phantasy faithfully; and then he knows how to 
attach to this reflection of his phantasy-life so 
strong a stream of pleasure that, for a time at 
least, the repressions are out-balanced and dispelled 
by it. When he can do all this, he opens out to 
others the way back to the comfort and consolation 
of their own unconscious sources of pleasure, and 
so reaps their gratitude and admiration; then he 
has won - through his phantasy - what before he could 
only win in phantasy: honor, power, and the love of
women. (Jones, 19^7, pp. 384-385)
Mackler and Shontz (1965) write of Freud’s view:
Freud felt there were three means of adapting 
to the hardships of life: powerful diversions of
interest, which lead one to care little for misery; 
substitutive gratifications, which lessen the misery, 
and intoxicating substances which make one insensi­
tive to it. Creativity was seen as a substitute, 
a means of running from hardships in order to achieve 
some degree, limited at times, of satisfaction. Sub­
limation aided in this substitution process by trans­
ferring instinctual aims into directions that could 
not be easily frustrated by the environment. The 
creative individual turns away from reality because 
he cannot meet the demands of renouncing instinctual 
satisfaction, and he turns to fantasy, where he gives 
full play to his erotic and ambitious wishes. To be
8successful he must mold his fantasies into a new 
reality: the product is his creation, be it in
art, music, science, or literature {!%$, p. 216).
What Freud seems to have said is that the artist is over­
whelmed by his failure to attain honor, power, riches, fame, 
the love of women. In order to cope with this overwhelmingly 
painful reality, the artist turns away from reality via re­
pression, and seeks to realize his wishes in fantasy life. At 
this point, the artist can become neurotic or not. Whether or 
not he does become neurotic, depends upon his ability to even­
tually attain gratification of his wishes in reality. If he 
is able to do so, he will not become neurotic, as is the case 
with what Freud refers to as the "true artist." Such a person 
is able, by virtue of his powerful capacity for sublimation 
(defined as the ability to exchange the original sexual aim 
for another that is no longer sexual) and a certain flexibil­
ity in regard to the repression determining the conflict, to 
derive great gratification from his fantasy life. He is cap­
able of understanding how to develop his daydreams so that 
they gratify the needs of other people, and of understanding 
how to modify or disguise them so that their unconscious ori­
gin is not really apparent. He is also able to express the 
content of his fantasy life very faithfully in his art. He is 
thus able to derive such great pleasure from his accon^lish- 
raent that repression is no longer a necessary method of coping 
for, by virtue of his fantasy life, he is able to attain in 
reality that which he had failed to attain previously, namely.
9honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women. Thus the 
"true artist" avoids neurosis by means of his ability to create 
for himself a new reality in which his wishes are gratified.
It is important to note that whether or not an artist can be 
considered neurotic, in accord with Freud's definition, his 
creative endeavor is motivated by a conflict, namely, the over­
whelming pain resulting from his failure to attain gratifica­
tion of his deepest wishes.
Freud's idea that the material for working out the conflict 
which, in effect, becomes the manifest substance of the crea­
tive production, is founded in the experience of childhood, is 
reflected in the following passage:
You will not forget that the stress laid on the 
writer's memories of his childhood, which perhaps 
seems so strange, is ultimately derived from the 
hypothesis that imaginative creation, like day­
dreaming, is a continuation of and substitute for 
the play of childhood (Freud, 1949, pp. 181-182).
It is important to note the essential role played by the un­
conscious in Freud's theory of creativity. Freud viewed the 
source of the artist's creative impulse as lying in some impor­
tant unconscious fantasy. This unconscious material supposed­
ly results in the creative act by virtue of the artist's power­
ful capacity for sublimation and his unique flexibility in re­
gard to repression. The latter was felt to be accomplished 
by some kind of ego dominated cooperation between a precon- 
scious and an unconscious ingjulse which circumvents the repres­
sive mechanisms. Associated with this process was what Freud
10
considered to be an unusual tolerance on the part of the artist 
for material in his unconscious. He felt that somehow the art­
ist's intellect imposed less restraint upon his imagination, 
but he did not elaborate on this process.
In summary, Freud conceived of the artist or the creative 
person as a conflict-ridden, frustrated, potential neurotic.
The source of the artist's conflict was felt to be an inability 
to obtain gratification for his instinctual needs (for honor, 
power, riches, fame, and love of women) and the corresponding 
repression of these ungratified needs. Accordingly, the art­
ist copes with the problem by turning away from reality and in­
vesting himself (interest and libido) in the realization of his 
wishes in fantasy. However, he is saved from becoming a neu­
rotic solely by virtue of an exceptional capacity for sublima­
tion in combination with an exceptional indirect access to, and 
tolerance for the unconscious material determining the conflict. 
These two qualities are seen as enabling the artist to transfer 
primitive and otherwise useless and unproductive fantasy into 
products celebrated by others as creative. And, by so doing, 
he is able to obtain gratification for his instinctual needs in 
reality.
Other Psychoanalytic Views
The notion that creativity is derived from or facilitated by 
conflict is supported by many psychoanalytic writers, both past 
and present. Bergler (19^7) viewed creativity in writers as an
11
expression of an unconscious desire to reproduce an "autarchic 
infantile fantasy" of oral independence as a spiteful defense 
against a masochistic dependence upon another. He later wrote:
I have never encountered a normal writer ....
In nearly twenty years of psychoanalytic practice,
I have seen a great number of neurotics, in ray of­
fice and outside. I admit that the most repressed 
and pitiful lot has been that of writers. On this 
score no other neurotic can beat them, (19^8, p.2^J).
Lee (1948), in agreement with the findings of the British 
psychoanalytic school, concluded that the wish to create is 
but an attempt to restore objects destroyed by the artist’s un­
conscious aggressive wishes. In the same vein. Bychowski (1951) 
wrote :
The progress of psychoanalytic knowledge has 
taught us the importance of preoedipal conflicts 
and we have sufficient clinical evidence to include 
them as sources of creative fantasies .... It is 
probable that the creative urge springs more often 
than not from less pathological sources among which 
narcissistic omnipotence is predominant (195-» pp#
593-594).
Jones’ views regarding motivational sources of creativity 
are summed up in the following statement:
When one considers the material used in the five 
arts - paint, clay, stone, words and sounds - any 
psychologist must conclude that the passionate inter­
est in bringing orderliness out of chaos must signify 
at the same time an extraordinary sublimation of the 
most primitive infantile enjoyments and the most ex­
treme denial of them. In psychoanalytical terms that 
passionate concentration represents a fixation on a 
stage of ’preliminary pleasure’ (1957, p. 4l5).
Deutsch (i960) believed the basis of conflict to lie in the 
unconscious, and that it is also in the unconscious that the 
creative and the neurotic solutions to conflict take place.
12
Like Freud, Deutsch viewed the motive and function of the cre­
ative production as a defense against neurosis;
As the instinctual pressure rises and a neurotic 
solution appears imminent, the unconscious defense 
against it leads to the creation of an art product.
The psychic effect is the discharge of the pent-up 
emotion until a tolerable level is reached (i960, 
p. 34).
Eissler (1961) has also emphasized the importance of con­
flict and pathology as the source of creativity. In his an­
alysis of the life and work of Leonardo da Vinci, Eissler 
stressed the role of unconscious conflicts in da Vinci's suc­
cess as an artist. Concerning the relationship between psycho­
pathology and creativity, he wrote:
It is no longer disputed that in the study of 
genius a surprisingly large amount of psychopathology 
is encountered .... Observation of the genius sug­
gests the possibility that psychopathology is indis- 
pensible to the highest achievements of certain kinds
(1961, p. 96).
Alexander (1964) upheld the traditional Freudian position 
regarding the role of conflict in creativity. He wrote:
In summary, the ultimate motive power behind 
creativity is the urge of mastery of tension cre­
ating situations, be it conflict with external re­
ality, internal conflict or struggle for greater 
mastery of the faculties of the body and the mind 
(1964, p. 127).
Stamm (1967) contended that the motivation for creative be­
havior is derived from primitive, unneutralized, aggressive, 
and libidinal sources. His observations of creative people 
convinced him that the motivation for creativity stems from 
unresolved unconscious conflicts:
13
It is the unconscious conflict that seems to 
provide the drive-cathexis so vital for the com­
pletion of creative work in individuals inherently 
endowed with specific sensory modalities. The re­
verse is also true: after periods of frenetic cre­
ative activity, one often notices a relaxation of 
tension in the artist, and a concurrent ebb in cre­
ative production. Economically, then, there ap­
pears to be an optimum range of t ension within which 
the creative individual works best (1967, p. 82}.
Stamm went on to state:
Creative expression is motivated by conflict, 
invariably driven by instinctual tension, nurtured 
fortuitously by the inheritance of hyperacute sen­
sory modalities which have been developed into in­
grained attributes or tools through habit. Crea­
tive expression can thus become a vehicle for the 
discharge of tension on all levels, subserving in­
stinctual demands, secondary autonomous functions, 
defense functions, and both the reality principle 
and the pleasure principle (1967, p. 94).
NeOPsychoanalytic Views
Freud's conceptions with regard to creativity have been mod­
ified by his followers to varying degrees in accord with the 
shift in emphasis from id processes to that of ego processes, 
and the corresponding shift in emphasis from unconscious to 
preconscious cognitive processes. The first really systemat­
ic statement reflecting this shift in emphasis appears to have 
come from Earnst Kris (1952). While some have interpreted his 
work as inferring that all creativity is not solely the result 
of conflict (Golann, 1962), this writer is less comfortable 
with such an inference. In essence, Kris deemphasized the im­
portance of the unconscious and stressed the inçortance of the 
preconscious in creativity. It was Kris who introduced the
111.
notion that the ego can initiate regression of its own func­
tions in accord with its own interests; that is, it can employ, 
at will, more primitive modes of functioning. This process has 
come to be known as regression in the service of the ego (Kris, 
1934), a concept which implies the flexibility on the part of 
the ego of which Freud spoke in vague and general terms. Such 
regressions were felt to be accompanied by a reduction of con­
trol over discharge of drive cathexis, resulting in patterns 
of more rapid discharge, but not without substantial ego re­
maining;
... Ego regression (primitivization of ego func­
tions) occurs not only when the ego is weak in sleep, 
in falling asleep, in fantasy, in intoxication, and 
in psychoses -- but also during many types of crea­
tive processes .... (19^0, pp. ^51-552).
Kris wrote of the creative person's capacity to allow his 
ego to enter into id territory and return (which distinguishes 
the creative person from the psychotic who cannot return, at 
least at will); to oscillate between closeness to the id and 
distance from it, thereby using the id in the service of the 
ego. Kris felt that the creative individual's powerful capa­
city for sublimation was related to his unique ability to ab­
sorb psychic energy, via many avenues, from the depths of the 
id, and to direct that energy into channels of creative ac­
tivity.
In further elaboration of Freud's views, Kris viewed crea­
tive people as having a less rigid defensive system; as cap­
able of exchanging or substituting different kinds of defenses
for each other; as able to drop certain defenses temporarily, 
and to employ more archaic defenses; all of which enable the 
creative person to keep more closely in touch with his uncon­
scious than is true of the non-creative person.
Getzels and Jackson found it difficult to reconcile the con­
cepts of creativity and pathology; to explain something as pos­
itive and healthy as creative behavior by means of repression, 
a concept with pathological connotations, despite the attempt 
to render it more appetizing by indicating that it takes place 
in the service of the ego. They pointed out that despite the 
psychoanalytic shift of emphasis from the unconscious to the 
preconscious as the source of creativity:
.... the special kinship between neurotic and indeed 
psychotic processes and creative processes in more or 
less maintained (1962, p. 94)«
Schachtel (19^9) has also found it difficult to reconcile 
the concepts of creativity and pathology. He held that crea­
tive behavior, according to the neopsychoanalytic view, is 
seen in essence as:
... the product of a repressed libidinal or aggressive 
impulse and of a regression to infantile luuues or 
thought or experience, to the primary process, al­
beit in the service of the ego (1959)» p. 2i|3).
Neo-neopsychoanalytic Views
The term "Neo-neopsychoanalytic"^ was chosen to depict an
^his terra was appropriated from Sigmund Koch (i960) who 
used it in regard to behaviorism.
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even further decrease In emphasis upon the importance of the 
unconscious and conflict with regard to creativity, and a cor­
responding tendency to associate creativity with emotional 
health. This trend is apparent in the views of the following 
theorists, Schafer (1958) elaborated upon Kris* concept, "re­
gression in the service of the ego";
Regression in the service of the ego is a par­
tial, temporary, controlled lowering of the level 
of psychic functioning to promote adaption. It pro­
motes adaption by maintaining, restoring, or improv­
ing inner balance and organization, interpersonal re­
lations, and work. It is the process which increases 
the individual’s access to preconscious and uncon­
scious contents, without a thoroughgoing sexualiza- 
tion or aggression of major ego functions, and there­
fore without descriptive anxiety and guilt (1958, 
p. 122).
Schafer went on to describe major psychological determinants 
likely to facilitate creative regression. These include a well- 
developed set of affect signals: a secure sense of self; rela­
tive mastery of early trauma; relative flexibility of defenses; 
a history of positive interpersonal relations; and a self-aware­
ness which includes meaningful and effective communication with 
others. Such characteristics are hardly compatablo with path­
ology, and thus the trend away from associating creativity with 
pathology is apparent.
Kubie (1958) departed even further from the traditional psy­
choanalytic position than did Kris and Schafer. Of previous 
psychoanalytic formulations he wrote:
In early days the importance of the unconscious 
in the derivation and shaping of the neurotic process
17
was still a fresh and astonishing discovery. There­
fore it was natural to assume that it must also be 
the source of the creative drive and of the great 
creative inspiration in human life. It is out of 
this natural but fallacious deduction that many er­
roneous cliches have been drawn: such as the notion
that a man produces only from his unconscious, that to 
be creative a man must be sick ....(1958, P» 47)*
Ruble's formulation explicitly rejected the role of the un­
conscious in creativity, and in fact, argued that the role of 
the unconscious is more likely to be one of interference with 
creativity. He held that the preconscious system is the es­
sential cornponent of creativity and that creativity is not pos­
sible unless the preconscious can grow freely. He went on to 
argue that both conscious and unconscious processes can inter­
fere with the preconscious process and render even the most 
potentially gifted person uncreative:
Where conscious processes predominate at one 
end of the spectrum, rigidity is imposed by the 
fact that conscious symbolic functions are an­
chored by their precise and literal relationships 
to specific conceptual and perceptual units.
Where unconscious processes predominate at the 
other end of the spectrum there is an even more 
rigid anchorage, but in this instance to unreal­
ity; that is, to those unacceptable conflicts, 
objects, aims, and impulses which have been ren­
dered inaccessible both to conscious introspec­
tion and to the corrective influence of experience
Yet flexibility of symbolic imagery is es­
sential if t.xe symbolic process is to have that 
creative potential which is our supreme human 
trait. I will repeat that this creative flex­
ibility is made possible predominantly if not 
exclusively by the free, continuous, and con­
current action of preconscious processes.
(1958, p. 38).
18
Kuble dismissed sublimation, the key concept in Freud's the­
ory of creativity, on the basis that the concept was misleading, 
based upon inaccurate assumptions, and formulated prior to the 
understanding of the preconscious system.
Van Den Haag (1963) also departed from the orthodox Freudian 
notion that creativity stems from the unconscious. Rather, he 
emphasized the special use that the ego makes of unconscious 
motivations and experiences, and stressed the relationship be­
tween creativity and mental health:
The creative disposition, the ability to rec­
ognize experience, perceive new elements and re­
spond in new ways valuable to the respondent in 
that ability is, I believe, part of general health 
and fostered by the factors that foster health.
To be non-creative is to be less than healthy. It 
involves not utilization but repitition of the past, 
and an inability to respond to new situations ex­
cept by mechanical repitition. Whereas the creative 
person utilizes it, the non-creative is shackled to 
the past (Van Den Haag, 1963, p. l5l).
Horney's (19^0) views were similar to those of Kubie and Van 
Den Haag. She believed that a person's capacity to be creative 
depends upon the extent to which his real self is alive; upon 
the extent to which he is able to experience life in depth and 
express this experience. She wrote:
And here we come to see the flaw in the con­
tention that neurotic conflicts are an indispen­
sable moving force for the artist. They may at 
best mobilize a temporary incentive, but the cre­
ative urge Itself and the creative power can 
stem only from his desire for self-realization and 
the energies in its service. To the extent to 
which these energies are shifted from the simple 
and direct experiencing of life to having to prove 
something -' that he is something he is not - his
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creative abilities are bound to be impaired. Con­
versely an artist may retrieve his productivity when 
in analysis his desire for (his drive toward) self- 
realization is liberated. And if the power of this 
drive had been recognized, the whole argument of val­
ue of neurosis for the artist would never have arisen 
in the first place. An artist then creates not be- 
cause of his neurosis but in spite oic it (1950,
p. 332).
Phillips (1957) was of the opinion that conflict and neuro­
tic functioning tend to interfere with creativity. Of Freud's 
explanation of the creative process, he wrote:
Freud's few attempts to explain the nature of 
art are not very iinpressive .... Perhaps the least 
inuressive of Freud's observations was that it was 
the desire for fame, power, and the love of women 
that lay behind the creative will of the writer.
Nor do I find a satisfactory explanation of the cre­
ative act in the analogies of daydreaming and fan­
tasy building noted by Freud. As for the origin of 
the creative gift, Freud insisted on many occasions 
that psychoanalysis had no special explanation for 
this mysterious force, though the concept of sub­
limation would suggest that all the achievements of 
civilization come from the taming of the id ....
Any total approach to art that sees the creative 
gift or process as a form of neurosis is bound to 
produce a lopsided and absurd theory .... It is 
true, of course, that people who are not creative 
may also be neurotic; hence the popular belief that 
the connection between art and neurosis has been 
much exaggerated (1957, pp.16-17).
Trilling (1957) also took issue with the position that neu­
rosis gives rise to creativity. He believed that neurosis is 
no more an explanatory factor in creativity than it is in nor­
mal everyday functioning, and that creative behavior depends 
upon and is evidence of some degree of mental health. He 
wrote :
We are all ill; but even a universal sickness 
inqplles an idea of health. Of the artist we must
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say that whatever elements of neurosis he has in 
common with his fellow mortals, the one part of him 
that is healthy, by any conceivable definition of 
health, is that which gives him power to conceive, 
to plan, to work, and to bring his work to a conclu­
sion (1957, p. 518).
And, finally, Michels wrote:
The time is long past when analysts assumed 
that, since neurotic behavior has unconscious 
roots, the discovery of unconscious motives in 
artists or scientists means that they are neu­
rotic (1969, p. 2).
Thus, there appears to be three distinguishable psychoanal­
ytic theoretical orientations with regard to the role of con­
flict in creativity. The first (psychoanalytic) includes those 
who agree with and support Freud's view that conflict is the 
primary source of creativity; the second (neopsychoanalytic) 
includes those who concede that conflict may not always be re­
lated to creative behavior; and the third (Neo-neopsychoanal- 
ytio) includes those who are of the opinion that conflict in­
terferes with or inhibits creativity. It is this third orien­
tation which provides a bridge between psychoanalytic and Non- 
psychoanalytic formulations regarding the role of conflict in 
creativity.
ITon-psychoanalytic Views
Allport (1937) believed that the process of striving, which 
includes creative striving, is a source of primary satisfaction 
to the striver. Goldstein (1939) agreed with Allport and cited 
self-actualization as the process by which man comes to realize 
his potential. In a similar vein. May (1959), who was critical
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of psychoanalytic approaches for their tendency to explain cre­
ative behavior by means of conflict, described creativity as:
.,, the expression of the normal man in the act of 
actualizing himself not as the product of sickness, 
but as the representation of the highest degree of 
emotional health (1959 , p. 58).
Schachtel (1959), in agreement with May, criticized the an­
alytic approach for similar reasons. He believed that the main 
motivation for creative behavior is not mysterious id forces, 
but rather a need to relate to the world, a process which he 
termed "the encounter." He, too, viewed the creative person 
as a healthy, optimally functioning individual who is open to 
the world.
Similar to the above approaches is that of Maslow (1959), 
who perhaps places somewhat more emphasis upon interpersonal 
factors. According to Maslow, when a person is mentally ill, 
his creativity is severely hampered. He viewed the person most 
likely to be creative as one who is maximally self-actualized 
or who has been most successful in realizing his potentials
In such a state, the person becomes more open 
to experience and far more spontaneous and fully 
functioning, essential characteristics as we have 
already seen, of self-actualizing creativeness 
(Maslow, 1959, p. 89).
Rogers
Rogers' special interest in creativity was sparked by his 
experience in psychotherapy, and from this experience sprang 
his theory of personality and, contained therein, his theory 
of creativity. In psychotherapy, Rogers saw clients create new
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formations of their own personalities and this phenomenon sug­
gested to him that the potential for creative behavior exists 
in all individuals. Rogers defines creativity as:
,,, the emergence in action of a novel relation­
al product growing out of the uniqueness of the in­
dividual on one hand and the materials, events, 
people or circumstances of his life on the other 
(1961, p. 350).
In discussing the motivation for creativity, Rogers wrote:
The mainspring of creativity appears to be the 
same tendency which we discover so deeply as the 
curative force in psychotherapy -- man's tendency 
to actualize himself, to become his potentialities 
(Ï9bl, p. 3bO).
In the above quotation, Rogers refers to what he views as a 
directional trend which is evident in all organic and human 
life —  the urge to expand, extend, develop, and mature; the 
tendency to express and activate all the capabilities of the 
organism or the self. Thus according to Rogers, man possesses 
as basic to his nature, a tendency to realize his potential, 
to become what he is capable of being, to do what he is cap­
able of doing. The extent to which the individual is able to 
realize his potential, to do what he is capable of doing, is 
the extent to which that individual is capable of behavior 
which Rogers defines as creative. Whether or not an indivi­
dual is capable of creativity depends, according to Rogers, up­
on the nature or quality of the environment to which that in­
dividual is exposed. If the seed of creativity which is in­
herent in every individual is properly nurtured, it will grow 
and blossom. If the proper nurture is not forthcoming, the
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seed will not grow and blossom and the individual will not re­
alize his potential. Instead, that individual’s creative po­
tential will be squelched and buried under layer after layer 
of psychological defenses constructed to protect the self-or­
ganization from conflict and resulting threat.
Rogers’ experience in psychotherapy has lead him to the 
opinion that the essential nurturing conditions of construc­
tive creativity are "psychological safety" and "psychological 
freedom," which he labels X. and Y respectively, X or psychol­
ogical safety is considered to be established by three associa­
tive processes: (l) The unconditional acceptance of the in­
dividual; (2) The provision of a psychological climate in which 
external evaluation is absent; and (3) Empathie understanding 
(Rogers, 1961, pp. 357-358).
"Unconditional acceptance of the individual" occurs when he 
is viewed as worthwhile in his own right in that he is a human 
being, rather than on the basis of his behavior or achievements. 
The individual who experiences unconditional acceptance feels 
safe - safe to be himself, to do his "own thing," to behave in 
a manner which is genuine as opposed to phoney. Such an indiv­
idual is free to discover what it means to be himself, to try 
to realize his potential, to actualize himself in new and 
spontaneous ways, and ultimately, to be creative.
"The provision of a psychological climate in which external 
evaluation is absent" involves situations in which an individual 
is not measured by external standards, for exaitple, grades, or
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level of achievement. Since evaluation is considered to he 
threatening, and to create a need for defensiveness and assoc­
iated distortion of the experience admitted to awareness, the 
absence of such evaluation is considered to be enormously free­
ing, It allows the individual to be more open to his experi­
ence, to better recognize his own likings and dislikings and 
the locus of evaluation within himself, and to move toward 
creativity,
"Empathie understanding" according to Rogers, provides the 
ultimate in psychological safety, as long as the other two pro­
cesses are also present. Empathie understanding refers to an 
individual being understood from his own point of view, rather 
than from the point of view of the person attempting to under­
stand. Empathie understanding also irplies the acceptance of 
the individual. In such a climate, the individual is able to 
permit his real self to emerge, and to express itself in var­
ied and novel ways as it relates to the world,
Y or "psychological freedom" is considered to occur when the 
individual is permitted complete freedom of symbolic expression. 
This permissiveness, according to Rogers, allows the individual 
complete freedom to think, feel, and be himself. It fosters 
openness (the ability to toy with percepts, concepts, ard 
meanings). It promotes a secure inner locus of evaluation, 
and hence, tends to bring about the inner conditions which 
Rogers felt to be most closely associated with potentially 
constructive creativity.
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There are three such inner conditions (conditions existing 
within the individual). They are: (1) Openness to experience 
or extensionality; (2) An internal locus of evaluation; and 
(3) The ability to toy with elements and concepts (Rogers, 1961,
pp. 323-322).
Openness to experience or extensionality is defined as the 
opposite of psychological defensiveness. Rogers defines psy­
chological defensiveness as the organism's response to exper­
iences which are perceived as threatening, or as conflicting 
or incongruent with the individual's picture of himself in re­
lation to the world. These threatening experiences are tem­
porarily rendered harmless by means of either denial to aware­
ness or by reaching awareness in distorted f orm. The indivi­
dual cannot accurately see those experiences, feelings, and 
reactions in himself which are significantly in conflict with 
the picture he already possesses of himself, A person whose 
self-organization is secure and free of conflict does not need 
to protect that self-organization by means of such defenses.
Such a person is thus maximally open to his experience, and 
each stimulus is freely relayed, without distortion, through 
the nervous system. Such a person is flexible as opposed to 
rigid in regard to concepts, beliefs, perceptions, and hypoth­
eses, He is able to tolerate ambiguity, and is able to re­
ceive conflicting information without forcing closure upon the 
situation.
Rogers believes that complete openness to experience is an
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Important condition of constructive creativity (Rogers, 1961, 
p. 3^2). He distinguishes between constructive creativity and 
non-constructive or socially destructive creativity. He points 
out that a very narrowly circumscribed openness to experience 
may be present in a deeply conflicted and maladjusted artist 
who is unaware of the inner sources of his unhappiness. Such 
an individual may, nevertheless, be very sensitively aware of 
form and color in his experience, and because there is this 
openness to one phase of experience, creativity is possible. 
However, because this openness is only to one phase of exper­
ience, the product of such an individual's creativity may be 
potentially destructive of social values. According to Rogers, 
the more the individual is capable of a sensitive awareness to 
all phases of his experience, the more likely his creativity 
will be personally and socially constructive.
"An internal locus of evaluation" is the second condition 
which is considered to be closely associated with constructive 
creativity. Rogers considers this to be one of the most funda­
mental conditions of creativity. It means that, for the crea­
tive individual, the value of his product is based upon his own 
evaluation, rather than upon the evaluation of others. Others' 
evaluations and criticisms are of interest, but play no essen­
tial part in his evaluation of his product.
"The ability to toy with elements and coicepts" is the third 
and final condition. Rogers conceives of this condition as 
less important than the first two, although still an important
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condition of creativity. The ability to toy with elements and 
concepts is considered to be associated with openness and lack 
of rigidity. It is the ability to play spontaneously with i- 
deas, concepts, and relationships in ways unimpeded by tradi­
tional conceptual limitations. Prom this spontaneous toying 
and exploration, there is seen as arising the creative viewing 
of life in new and significant ways.
According to Rogers, if the above three conditions obtain, 
constructive creativity will occur. He wrote:
From the very nature of the inner conditions of 
creativity, it is clear that they cannot be forced, 
but must be permitted to emerge. The former can­
not make the germs develop and sprout from the seed; 
he can only supply the nurturing conditions which 
will permit the seed to develop its own potential­
ities. So it is with creativity (1961, p. 3^7).
In summary, Rogers views the constructively creative indivi­
dual as one who has experienced unconditional acceptance and 
empathie understanding in his interaction with the primary fig­
ures in his life. As a result, he experiences a psychological 
safety which permits him freedom to think, feel, and be him­
self, His well developed self-concept and self-organization 
render him minimally defensive and maximally secure, and enable 
him to leave himself open to all experience. He is flexible 
and can tolerate considerable ambiguity and conflicting infor­
mation without forcing closure. His values are self-determined 
as is his behavior. He is able to play spontaneously with 1- 
deas and to see beyond traditional conceptual limitations; to 
see in significantly new and meaningful ways. In short, the
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creative person Is seen as one who comes closest to realizing 
his human potential.
Summary
The Psychoanalytic theoretical orientations presented began 
with Freud (19^9, 1957) who viewed conflict as the primary 
source of creativity and included those who have supported 
this view (Bergler, 1948; Lee, 1948; Bychowski, 1951; Jones, 
1957; Deutsch, I960; Bissler, 1961; Alexander, 1964; Stamm, 
1967). Next came tne Neopsychoanalytic view that creative be­
havior need not always have its source in conflict (Kris, 1952). 
And, finally, came the Neo-neopsychoanalytic view that conflict 
inhibits creativity (Schafer, 1958; Kubie, 1958; Van Den Haag, 
1963; Horney, 1950; Phillips, 1957; Trilling, 1957; Michels,
1969).
As was pointed out earlier, this third orientation provides 
a bridge between Psychoanalytic and Non-psychoanalytic views 
regarding the role of conflict in creativity. The Non-psycho- 
analytic theoretical orientations presented (Allport, 1937; 
Goldstein, 1939; May, 1959; Schachtel, 1959; Maslow, 1959; Rog­
ers, 1959, 1961), in agreement with the Neo-neopsychoanalytic 
orientations, argued that conflict inhibits creativity. How­
ever, the major difference between the Neo-psychoanalytic and 
the Non-psychoanalytic orientations seems to be that the latter 
go farther in that they view creativity in an individual, not 
only as indication of the absence of significant conflict in
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that individual, but as indication of exceptional emotional 
health. To state this in Rogsrs* terras, the truly creative 
person is viewed as one who has corae closest to realizing his 
human potential.
Empirical Studies
In Support of Freud
While there are many theoretical statements and generaliza­
tions from clinical observations supporting the Freudian posi­
tion regarding the role of conflict in creativity, there are 
few empirical studies which do so. The following studies are 
the only reasonably substantial studies to be found in psycho­
logical literature relating to the problem at hand.
White (1939) attempted to investigate whether or not any 
kinds of mental achievements tend to be associated with patho­
logical mental conditions. Among the kinds of mental achieve­
ments considered, was that of creativity. His data consisted 
of biographical material to which (unreported) statistical pro­
cedures were applied. White concluded that aesthetical types, 
particularly poets and novelists appear to be distinctly "less 
well balanced" than the average of other types of genius. It 
was speculated that the poet or novelist experiencing conflict 
may sometimes respond by taking refuge in an inner world of 
"feeling and imagination." This study is vulnerable to criti­
cism on the basis of poor controls, unreported statistical meth­
ods, an inadequate definition of pathology, inadequate data
30
(mentioned by the author himself), and the use of subjective 
impressions as opposed to objective criterion for determining 
the extent of pathology.
There is some evidence that the home life of creative sciœ - 
tists and some other professional groups has been less happy 
than the home life of the average person. Mackinnon (I96I), 
for example, found that the male child often found it impos­
sible to identify with his father, a factor which was felt to 
have interfered with proper sex-role identification. The lat­
ter condition was found to be associated with creative tenden­
cies. Weisberg and Springer (1961) generally agree. Through 
tests and interviews, they elicited information indicating that 
the family of the more creative child is not a close one. The 
home was characterized by serious (parental) marital problems 
and considerable dissension. Little emphasis was placed on the 
child’s adopting the values of the parents, and little concern 
was paid to the child’s regressions, conditions which the au­
thors viewed as contributing to the development of creative 
tendencies.
Goertzel and Goertzel (1962) studied the biographies of em­
inent and presumably creative individuals. They found what 
they felt to be a hi^ incidence of troubled homes and "wretch­
ed childhoods" in the histories of these individuals. Handi­
caps and uncommon characteristics among the parents were fre­
quently present, and many of these individuals suffered exper­
iences which the authors felt to be common in the lives of
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those who later become delinquent, neurotic, or psychotic.
In an often quoted study, ÜSnsterberg and Mussen (1953) in­
vestigated the relationship between personality structure and 
artistic creativity in the plastic and graphic arts. They at­
tempted to test seven hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic 
writings and empirical studies regarding the personality char­
acteristics of artists. Their subjects were thirty exception­
ally promising art students and thirty non-art students from 
several different fields. The personality measures used con­
sisted of the TAT and a personality questionnaire. The data 
was interpreted as supporting the following hypotheses: (a)
More artists than non-artists are introverted and have a rich 
inner life; (b) More artists than non-artists have intense 
guilt feelings; (c) More artists than non-artists have a strong 
need to express their feelings and ideas either verbally or 
nonverbally; (d) More artists than non-artists show overt ag­
gressive tendencies; (e) More artists than non-artists value 
acceptance of their work more than personal acceptance or rec­
ognition; (f) More artists than non-artists are unable or un­
willing to comply with parents, and the demands and wishes of 
society. No support, however, was found for the hypothesis 
that more artists than non-artists would experience conflict 
with their parents.
The authors mentioned that,while there is some evidence that 
intense guilt feelings are more prevalent among artists than 
among non-artists, the study did not test the hypothesis that
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the artist’s creativity serves as a means of relieving these 
feelings. It was also mentioned that the data did not support 
the hypothesis that appreciation of the artist’s work supplies 
basic narcissistic gratification for the artist or that such 
appreciation is interpreted by him as evidence that others 
share his guilt.
^he authors point out that although their findings were in­
terpreted as supporting some aspects of psychoanalytic theory 
concerning the artist, they were not interpreted as confirming 
all of the theory. Certainly some of the interpretations of 
the data are open to question. For example, the fact that 
more artists than non-artists preferred social situations "in­
volving a few close friends in contrast to large group activi­
ties such as social dances" was interpreted as evidence of in­
troversion. It is important to note that Maslow found this 
very preference to be characteristic of individuals which he 
termed self-actualizing, Maslow (19^9) also found self-actual­
izing individuals to be unwilling to comply with demands and 
wishes of parents and society which ran counter to their own 
personal standards and moral codes. The interpretation regard­
ing intense guilt feelings being more prevalent among artists 
could be accounted for, at least in part, on the basis of a 
greater self-awareness and honesty on the part of artists. In 
addition, some of the other findings can be interpreted as 
lending support to the Rogerian position. For example, the 
greater need for self-expression and the richer inner life
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among artists both would have been predicted on the basis of 
Rogerian theory. Moreover, as is true of most, if not all, of 
the studies encountered in existing literature, the population 
sang)led (artists) was narrowly circumscribed and the findings 
cannot be legitimately extended to creative people in general. 
Finally, and of great importance, creativity was not opera­
tionally defined, and what was termed creative once again 
smacked of a heightened capacity to please an instructor on the 
part of a student who skillfully conformed to acceptable artis­
tic standards.
Maddi (1965) had accused contemporary psychology of harbor­
ing "a couple of old wives' tales" concerning creativity, one 
of which was that a person is not likely to be creative if he 
is in a state of strong frustration and torment. He indicated 
that such a state is supposed to narrow the focus of percep­
tion, intention, and cognition so that a person is too con­
cerned with the alleviation of pain and the satisfaction of de­
privations to be able to muster the freedom and sense of safety 
required for the creative behavior. He went on to state that 
this kind of thinking is found in the explicit and inç)licit 
statements of psychotherapists, proponents of self-actualiza­
tion and exploratory and curiosity behavior. Of such a posi­
tion he wrote:
It may be true that some of the people who 
show evidence of strong torment and frustration 
do not seem to be living up to their creative 
potential. But this alone cannot constitute a 
demonstration that it is the existence or strength
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of these states that inhibits creativity. The 
case for the old wives’ tale would be much 
stronger if it were also true that people who 
are creative do not show much torment and frus­
tration. But when we consider the lives of 
people who have been significantly creative, we 
find very little that conforms to this ....
More systematic evidence for my criticism is 
provided by a study from my laboratory .... The 
evidence clearly indicates that the frustration
and torment of need states does not necessarily
inhibit creativity (1965, p. 332).
The study to which Maddi referred (Maddi and Berne, 1964) 
was an attempt to determine if the desire for novelty and 
novelty of productions variables represent, respectively, 
passive and active f crms of the need for variety, cr if the
novelty of productions variable is measuring not a form of
the need for variety, but rather the tendency toward origi­
nal cr creative functioning. The authors reasoned that if 
the latter were so, assuming that the creative process is 
one involving playfulness, flexibility, and freedom, it would 
be expected that creativity would be reduced by strong moti­
vations including conflict. This reduction would be achieved 
as a result of the narrowing of the focus of attention and in­
tention brought about by strong motivations. It was further 
reasoned that if the existence of any strong motivational 
state is inconsistent with creative functioning, the novelty 
of productions variable ought to be negatively correlated not 
only with desire for novelty, but with measures of other mo­
tives as well. In contrast, if the existence of any strong 
motivational state is not inconsistent with creative function-
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ing, novelty of productions should be positively correlated 
with desire for? novelty, as these two variables are consid­
ered alternate manifestations of a single underlying motiva­
tion.
The authors administered TAT pictures to a group of 60 male 
undergraduate volunteers and the stories composed were scored 
for novelty of productions, desire for novelty, and needs for 
achievement, affiliation, and power. It was found that novel­
ty of productions was negatively correlated with desire for 
novelty, but not with needs for achievement, affiliation, and 
power. These results were interpreted as supportive of the 
position that these two variables tap active and passive forms, 
respectively, of the need for variety, and as failing to sup­
port the alternative position that novelty of productions re­
flects the non-motivational tendency toward creative function­
ing which is diminished by any strong motive. The author's 
vague and merely implied definition of strong motivational 
states seems broad enough to include anything from love of 
travel to the predicament of Isaac. While the authors con­
cede that there are other adequate explanations of these re­
sults, to claim as they did, that this study "clearly indicat­
ed that the frustration and torment of need states does not 
necessarily inhibit creativity," is a classic example of in­
ferences which extend well beyond the data.
The above study was included because it is one of the few
\
empirical studies tending to support the Freudian position.
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Actually, it does not support Freud’s position as much as it 
fails to support Rogers’.
In Support of Both Freud and Rogers
The following studies cannot be categorized as supportive 
of either the Freudian or the Rogerian positions as a whole; 
but rather they provide some support for certain aspects of 
each. At the same time, they fail to support certain aspects 
of each position. They were included because they may be con­
sidered inç)ortant studies in view of the frequency with vftiich 
they appear in the literature. In addition, they are repre­
sentative of the studies found in the literature which appear 
to provide some support for both positions, and reflective of 
the prevailing confusion regarding the relationship between 
creativity and personality factors.
Barron (19^3 a) investigated cognitive conçlexity and sim­
plicity as a personality dimension. Subjects consisted of 1^.0 
male graduate students from approximately twelve departments, 
who had been carefully studied by means of a large number of 
objective tests, exî)erimental procedures, and extensive inter­
views. Subjects were then assessed and rated by several emi­
nent psychologists on I4.O variables. Two basic perceptual ten­
dencies or preferences were found: the preference for perceiv­
ing and dealing with complexity, and that for perceiving and 
dealing with simplicity. These two correlates were viewed as 
pervading many areas of human behavior, both having their ef-
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fective and ineffective,aspects regarding human functioning.
The preference for complexity factor was found to be positive­
ly correlated with originality and artistic expression, breadth 
of interest, independence of judgment, impulsiveness, sensual­
ity, and effeminacy. It was found to be negatively correlated 
with rigidity, constriction, repression, conservitism, and so­
cial conformity. The preference for simplicity tended to be 
inversely related to the above characteristics,
Barron also found that both groups contained effective and 
well adjusted individuals and ineffective and poorly adjusted 
individuals. A .3I+ correlation of complexity with overt anxi­
ety as measured by the Welsh Anxiety Index (MMPI) suggested 
that the perceptual decision in favor of admitting complexity 
may also make for greater subjectively experienced anxiety.
It was reasoned that in order to tolerate complexity, one must 
be able to tolerate anxiety. The findings also suggested that 
the highest level of personal stability and balance may be 
found at the positive end of the continuum on the preference 
for simplicity dimension. If subjectively experienced anxiety 
is positively correlated with conflict, as many would claim, 
these results could be interpreted as supporting the Freudian 
position. On the other hand, it could be argued that some con­
flict could exist buried and well concealed under strong and 
effective personality defenses resulting in a minimum of sub­
jectively experienced anxiety. At the same time, Barron's 
finding that effective and well adjusted individuals exist
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among both groups, fails to provide support for either posi­
tion.
The other frequently cited study which falls into this lim­
bolike category is that of MacKinnon (1965) who investigated 
personality factors among creative architects. MacKinnon ob­
tained what, in his opinion, was a sample of highly creative 
architects by asking professors of architecture to nominate 
the lj.0 most outstanding creative architects in the country.
(13 of these were nominated by i| professors, 11 by 3» 13 by 2, 
and ij.0 by 1. These statistics suggest that selection of sub­
jects was far from unanimous.) Subsequently, each panel member 
rated the creativity of those not nominated by him originally. 
Two other groups were also selected to represent significantly 
different levels of creativity. Group I was considered to be 
the most creative. Group II next in creativeness, ard Group III, 
least creative. It was hypothesized that Group I would be the 
"creative type," Group II, the "conflicted type," and Group III, 
the "adapted or normal type," The selected architects were 
then studied with respect to (a) the nature of the individual's 
socialization and his interpersonal behavior (b) the level of 
richness or complexity of his psychological development, and 
(c) the degree of personal soundness or psychological health 
manifested. It is important to note that Group I underwent in­
tensive testing in person, whereas Groups II and III were test­
ed by mail. The data were interpreted as generally supportive 
of the hypothesis. Group II was found to be "unequivocally
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more conflicted and psychologically disturbed" than either 
Group I or III. However, the scores of Group I were report­
ed to be very close to those of Group II on some personality 
measures. On others, such as the Barron Es scale and the Gough 
Self Assertiveness Scale, Group I scored significantly higher 
than Group II. At the same time, it is stated that personal 
histories revealed that Group I came from homes which provided 
extraordinary respect by parents for child, an early granting 
of unusual freedom, and a relatively better parent-child rela­
tionship, all of which were considered to have a liberating 
effect upon them as children.
The finding that Groups I and II (the former scoring signi­
ficantly higher than the latter, and both scoring significant­
ly higher than Group III) were found to be high in psychologi­
cal richness ana complexity was interpreted in accord with 
Rankian theory. Rank considered the conflicted and neurotic 
type to be close to the creative type. He reasoned that it is 
only out of the richness, complexity, and conflict experienced 
by the neurotic type that the creative integrations character­
istic of the creative type are achieved. In regard to this 
matter, MacKinnon wrote:
And I would reject any inference which might 
be drawn from my remarks, that one must be neu­
rotic if one is to be creative. Rather, in agree­
ment with Lawrence Kubie (1961) I believe that 
both neurotic and creative potential are inherent 
in the structure of the human psyche. It is a 
question of which gets emphasized and most devel­
oped in any given person (p. 280),
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In a statement which seems difficult to reconcile with some 
of the findings and the above theoretical implications, MacKin­
non wrote:
If I were to draw a summary picture .... I 
would say that what is most inç>ressive about ar­
chitects is the degree to which they have actual­
ized their creative potentialities. They have be­
come in large measure the persons they were capable 
of becoming .... They are perhaps the prototype of 
the person of strong ego, the man of will and deed. 
Confident in themselves and basically self-accept­
ing, they are to an unusual degree able to recognize 
and give expression to most aspects of inner exper­
ience and character, and thus are able more fully to 
be themselves and realize their own ideals (p. 280),
Van Den Haag (1963) critized MacKinnon’s method of selecting 
his creative subjects. He wrote:
MacKinnon studies architects whose work was la­
beled "creative" by a panel of colleagues. So 
used, "creativity" comes near to meaning success 
or approval by colleagues. Though one may be relat­
ed to the other - more often negatively, I think, 
than positively - success and creativity are not 
identical enough to regard MacKinnon’s study of suc­
cessful architects as a study of "creative" ones.
The rating "creativity" may amount to winning e 
popularity contest; or be based on fashionablness 
of an architectural style; or an originality, or 
perhaps, the works of the "creative" architects 
met on the popular stereotype of creativity. The 
least implication of the selection method is : what 
colleagues call creativity, actually is creativity.
When no operational definition is given (creativity) 
remains unolarified (1963, p. l46).
In addition to the above criticism, the fact that the eval­
uation process was not the same for the three groups makes for 
an in^ortant uncontrolled variable. The final criticism in­
volves the seemingly conflicting interpretation of the data 
in which Group I is viewed as nearly as emotionally disturbed
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as Group II, and yet as "having become in large measure, the 
persons they were capable of becoming «.. the prototype of 
the person of strong ego."
In Support of Rogers
The literature contains considerably more support for the 
Rogerian than the Freudian position. An attempt has been made 
to include the better studies relating to the problem of the 
role of conflict in creativity. Most of the studies cited did 
not deal specifically with that problem, but rather with the 
relationship between creativity and such factors as psycholog­
ical adjustment, personal and intellectual functioning, life 
styles, frustration, anxiety, stress, personality integration, 
and defensiveness. While all of these factors certainly can 
be said to relate to "conflict," only one study was found which 
specifically dealt with the role of conflict in creativity.
A review of the literature yields frequent clinical impres­
sions regarding the effect of successful psychotherapy and the 
resulting resolution of conflicts upon creativity. The major­
ity of writers are of the opinion that where there is genuine 
talent and creativity, successful resolution of conflicts 
through psychotherapy will result in greater creativity. Even 
Freud, himself, was of this opinion. In reply to a violinist 
who posed this issue, he wrote:
It is not out of the question that an analysis 
results in its being impossible to continue an art­
istic activity. Then, however, it is not the
J+2
fault of the analysis; it would have happened in 
any case and it is only an advantage to learn in 
good time. When, on the other hand, the artistic 
impulse is stronger than the internal resistances, 
analysis will heighten, not diminish, the capacity 
for achievement (Jones, 19^7).
While there has been much speculation regarding this ques­
tion, one of the few attempts to submit it to relatively rigor­
ous empirical test is found in the work of Fried (196^), a 
three year longitudinal investigation of the effects of long­
term psychotherapy on six distinguished and prominent artists. 
These were a sculptor, a writer, an actor-singer and three 
painters. In an effort to circumvent the difficult problem of 
determining the extent or quality of creative performance, the 
criteria used consisted of constructiveness and appropriateness 
of work habits, and quantity of output. The data was inter­
preted as demonstrating that the constructiveness and appropri­
ateness of work habits and quantity of output increased signi­
ficantly as a result of psychoanalytically oriented psychother­
apy. While this study can be criticized primarily on the basis 
of a small sançle, and the fact that it dealt with changes in 
work patterns and productivity as opposed to changes in creativ­
ity, it is probably the best attempt appearing in the litera­
ture to submit this particular problem to enç>irical test. While 
the results were predicted by Freud himself, they are more eas­
ily reconcilable with the position of Rogers than that of Freud 
regarding the role of conflict in creativity.
Barron (19^7) attempted to investigate the relationship be­
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tween originality and other aspects of personal and intellectu­
al functioning of extraordinarily effective military officers. 
Tests measuring originality consisted of the Unusual Uses Test, 
the Consequences Test, and the Plot Titles Test. Projective 
tests were used to measure personality variables. It was found 
that the effectively original person is characterized by an 
ability to regress very far temporarily, but with an equal a- 
bility for rapid return to a high degree of rationality, and 
for making effective use of the terrorary regression. Accurate 
and self-confident reality testing was viewed as facilitative 
of imaginative powers. It was concluded that the basis for re­
gression in the highly creative individuals is precisely op­
posed to the basis for regression in mentally ill individuals. 
While findings were interpreted in terms of psychoanalytic the­
ory (regression in the service of the ego), assuming that 
greater tolerance of regression and associated lack of rigid­
ity, and accurate and self-confident reality testing are char­
acteristics associated with greater effectiveness, these find­
ings appear to provide more support for the Rogerian than for 
the Freudian position.
Reid, King, and Wickwire (1959) attempted to systematically 
investigate differences in certain cognitive and other person­
ality characteristics between children who are perceived as 
creative by their peers and those who are not so perceived. 
The Ss were 48 seventh graders selected on the basis of sex, 
family status, and peer nominations of creativity, who were
administered cognitive and personality attitudinal measures.
The measures were the IPAT Junior Personality Quiz, the Brown- 
Holtzman Survey of Study Habits and Attitudes, the Texas Coop­
erative Youth Study, and the McCandless Anxiety Scale. It was 
found that creative children held more desirable attitudes to­
ward their school work, tended to value intellectual attainment 
more highly, and evidenced a higher degree of self-discipline. 
The most salient finding was that creative children appeared 
less anxious than non-creative children.
The main criticism of the Reid, et al, study centers around 
the selection of Ss. The only criterion of creativity was peer 
selection of creativity behavior. From what is reported, one 
cannot help but wonder if peer selection was more heavily in­
fluenced by such factors as popularity and a demonstrated high 
level of performance in class, than by factors associated with 
original and innovative behavior. The absence of any objective 
and empirical check as to whether or not Ss selected by peers 
were, in fact, ’’creative” renders the results somewhat suspect,
Golann (1962) hypothesized that one difference between what 
he termed ”extreme” groups (artists and writers in contrast to 
people in general, military personnel, and psychiatric inpat­
ients) was the degree to which they strive to express them­
selves in their inter-action with their environment. Artists 
and writers were seen as striving to experience their environ­
ment in new ways and to deal actively with their environment in 
such a way as to express themselves, or as the author stated,
"to experience their selves in action, to use Rogers (1959) 
terms." Those belonging to the other extreme were seen as de­
fending against the environment, or dealing with it in such a 
way as to maximize predicability, comprehensibility, and sta­
bility* It was further hypothesized that individuals strongly 
motivated to experience their perceptual, cognitive, and ex­
pressive potentials would prefer objects and situations per­
mitting more ideosyncratic ways of dealing with them.
Golann*s Ss were 150 male undergraduates who gave one asso­
ciation to each figure in the Welsh Figure Preference Test 
(VJFPT) and filled out questionnaires regarding their prefer­
ences for activities and situations. It was found that Ss pre­
ferring "ambiguous, evocative, and dynamic stimuli" on the WPPT 
preferred activities and situations allowing for self-expres­
sion, independence, and the utilization of creative capacity.
In contrast, those preferring less ambiguous, evocative, and 
dynamic stimuli on the WPPT, preferred structured, assigned, 
familiar, or routine activities which allow less self-expres­
sion and are less demanding of creative capacity. These find­
ings were interpreted as supporting the author's hypotheses and 
as being "more consistent with the self-actualization views for 
creativity than with the reductionistic theories" (Golann,
1962, p. 598).
Hinton (1968) studied the effect of environmental frustra­
tion on creative problem solving performance. Alternate forms 
of analysis were applied to test the relationship between en-
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vlronmental frustration and creativity under various sets of 
assunçtions about the experimental conditions. It was con­
cluded that environmental frustration significantly reduced 
creative problem solving performance.
Guenther (1966) investigated the relationship between anx­
iety and cognitive processes in children and youth in a school 
setting. It was found that anxiety interferred with creative 
thinking and complex learning, tended to interfere with cogni­
tive processes, and facilitated simple learning.
Fleischer (196^) examined the relationship between anxiety 
and creativity. High anxious (HA) and low anxious (LA) male 
introductory psychology students were administered four tests 
of creativity (Remote Associates Test, Alternate Uses Test, 
Consequences Test, and Concept Mastery Test). The two groups 
were matched for intelligence. Anxiety was measured by the 
Mandler-Saranson Anxiety Scale. Half of each anxiety group was 
placed under high-stress conditions, and half under low-stress 
conditions. In a related experiment, 1|.0 HA and 1+0 M  Ss were 
administered the Maier Coat-Rack problem to solve in order to 
investigate the effects of anxiety and stress in a more life­
like situation. It was found that two of the four measures of 
creativity significantly discriminated between HA and LA indiv­
iduals, the former performing less well than the latter. The 
Alternate Uses Test did not discriminate except when scored 
for infrequent responses, whereupon LA Ss produced more infre­
quent responses than HA Ss. The Remote Associates Test failed
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to discriminate at all. Different degrees of stress were found 
to be of no significance either in terms of analysis of vari­
ance, main effects, or in regard to interactions with other 
variables,
On the basis of these findings, the author tentatively con­
cluded that tests of creativity (generally) tend to be sensi­
tive to anxiety. However, this relationship was felt to be a 
function of specific stimulus factors which may be present in 
tests of creativity. It was further concluded that tests of 
creativity which are sensitive to anxiety seem to be ambiguous 
and divergent, and to demand independence of thought and judg­
ment . It was felt that this may reflect a tendency on the part 
of HA individuals to behave in a conforming and cautious manner 
in situations which are vague and unstructured.
Zdep (1966) compared high, middle, and low creativity in 
groups of reportedly creative individuals (matched for IQ) on 
the variable of anxiety as measured by the Taylor Manifest An­
xiety Scale. Creative individuals were found to be less con­
forming than other less creative individuals, and highly crea­
tive individuals were found to possess a lower level of anxiety 
than individuals of lower creativity.
McReynolds, Acker, and Pietila (196I) attempted to determine 
whether or not there is a relationship between object curiosity 
(associated with creativity) and psychological adjustment. The 
Ss were 30 upper middle class children, ll(. females and 16 males, 
with a mean age of 11.5 years. Ratings of object curiosity were
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made by teachers and a variation of an object curiosity test. 
Estimates of psychological adjustment were based upon ratings 
made by the classroom teacher utilizing six behavioral rating 
scales: nervous behavior, worry over achievement, classroom ad­
justment, adjustment to teacher, adjustment to peers, and over­
all psychological health. Ratings were also obtained in regard 
to scholastic activation, activity level, creativity, original­
ity, and curiosity, with the prediction in each case being a 
positive relationship with object curiosity. A positive rela­
tionship was found between object curiosity and high psycholog­
ical adjustment, while a negative relationship was found be­
tween curiosity and maladjustment. The authors interpreted 
their findings as suggesting that aspects of learning which de­
pend upon curiosity may be hindered by anxiety. As the authors 
themselves point out, this study is vulnerable to criticism on 
the basis of its small sample; but more important is the fact 
that the determination of adjustment was based completely 
upon the judgments of only one rater who, in addition to rating 
adjustment, also rated Ss for object curiosity, and was the Ss' 
classroom teacher.
Tcrtorella (196?) attempted to assess the effect of a stress­
ful situation upon the performance of individuals who are de­
signated high creative (HC) and low creative (LC)» Creativity 
was measured by the Remote Associates Test (RAT). The Ss were 
45 HC and LG male college freshmen. The HCs were those who 
scored in the top 27 percent on the RAT, the LCs were those who
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scored in the bottom 2? percent on the same test. The HC and 
LG Ss were divided into control, moderate, and severe stress 
groups; stress consisting of verbal criticism of performance 
on an ambiguous task. Following the stress task. Form II of 
the RAT was individually administered. The authors concluded 
that HC scorers were able to function more effectively than LC 
scorers under a similar stress situation. The level of stress 
itself (moderate or severe) appeared to have no appreciable ef­
fect upon performance. These findings were interpreted as sug­
gesting that HC individuals possess characteristics (indepen­
dence, dominance, self-confidence, and perseverance) which al­
low them to work effectively even when the circumstances in 
which they are working are somewhat stressful.
Stein and Meer (1954) administered the Rorschach to 18 in­
dustrial research chemists who purportedly showed more or less 
creative ability. The scoring system used gavethe highest 
score to a well-integrated response given to a difficult card 
at the shortest exposure. A biserial correlation of .88 be­
tween total weighted score and criterion creativity ratings was 
reported. An overall analysis revealed that individuals judged 
as being more creative achieved significantly more well inte­
grated responses than did individuals judged as being less cre­
ative. It was suggested that the difference between individu­
als with more and less creative potential might be a function 
of the letter's defensiveness and over-criticalness which in­
terferes with the generation and communication of hypotheses.
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This study is open to criticism on the basis of its small sam­
ple and the rather loose definition of creativity. In addition, 
the criterion used in determining to which group Ss belonged 
was not reported.
In a very sound study. Bowers (196^) attempted to investi­
gate the hypothesis that potential for creativity is inhibited 
by defensiveness. It was hypothesized that hypnosis and sug­
gestion of reduced defensiveness should lessen inhibition and 
allow fuller expression of creativity. The Ss, 80 female col­
lege students who had attained a score of at least 7 on the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility, were randomly 
assigned to four experimental groups in which both state of the 
S (hypnotic or waking) and kind of instruction (cognitive set 
or defense-reducing) were varied. A pretest under waking con­
ditions was administered to all groups. Among the creativity 
tests used were the Alternate Uses and Consequences Tests, half 
of which were administered during pretest conditions, and half 
during postest conditions. The pretest waking groups were 
asked to relax and the hypnotic groups were hypnotized. One 
of the two hypnotic groups and one of the two waking groups was 
then read a cognitive set instruction to be original, clever, 
flexible, and fluent. The other hypnotic and waking groups 
were read a defense-reducing instruction. It was found that 
both hypnotic groups attained higher scores on Remote Conse­
quences than did the waking groups (p<.001). Ho main or inter­
action effects were found with regard to the kind of instruc-
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tion. The data indicated that hypnosis can increase test or­
iginality above the level exhibited by relaxed waking Ss with 
the same instructions regarding creative expression. The au­
thor interpreted these findings as suggesting that highly crea­
tive individuals may be less defensive than less creative in­
dividuals. .
The study which provided the major impetus for the present 
research was that done by Vogel (1968), who also attempted to 
compare Freud’s and Rogers’ positions with regard to the role 
of conflict in creativity. Vogel attempted to induce a state 
of conflict in 60 university undergraduates whose responses to 
a religious questionnaire (Wrightsman, 1961) indicated them to 
be highly religious. These Ss were then divided randomly into 
experimental and control groups. Conflict was generated in the 
experimental Ss by requiring them to choose whether or not to 
view pictures of nude women. Control Ss were required to 
choose whether or not to view a local newspaper, a choice as­
sumed to be devoid of conflict. Prior to the actual decision, 
Ss were administered three creativity tests (Alternate Uses, 
Consequences, and Circles Tests). Results indicated that con­
flict impaired creativity but not productivity. These results 
were,interpreted as supporting the Rogerian position regarding 
the role of conflict in creativity.
One criticism of the above study is that control for intel­
lectual functioning employed only one measure, GPA (grade point 
average). A more telling criticism involves measures of arous-
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al and the scoring of the creativity tests. The determination 
of whether or not an actual state of conflict was induced was 
based upon arousal (skin conductance) measures and responses to 
a Likert conflict scale obtained in a pilot study of li). Ss.
Skin conductance readings taken at the point where experimental 
Ss were informed of the choice to be made, and at the end of 
instructions, were significant (both at the .02 level). How­
ever, there is no way of determining if this heightened arousal 
was due to conflict or to affect associated with sexual arousal 
brought about by the introduction of content relating to nude 
women. Even if the former were true, difference in skin con­
ductance readings obtained at the end of each of the three cre­
ativity tests (the only measures reported, although it was in­
dicated that skin conductance readings were taken at the be­
ginning, middle, and end of each creativity test) were not sig­
nificant. Thus the determination of whether or not an actual 
state of conflict was induced was based solely upon the results 
of a non-standardized, self-report Likert scale. It was then 
assumed that the situation was conflict generating, and no a- 
rousal measures were obtained during the actual research.
With regard to the scoring of the creativity tests, there 
was no mention as to how and by whom this was done.
Summary
While there are many theories, statements, and generaliza­
tions from clinical observations supporting the Freudian posi-
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tlon regarding the role of conflict in creativity, there are 
very few empirical studies which support the Freudian position. 
No one of these studies dealt specifically with the role of 
conflict in creativity. Rather, they dealt with the relation­
ship between creativity and such factors as pathological men­
tal conditions (White 1939), early home life (MacKinnon 1961; 
Weisberg and Springer, 1961; Goertzel and Goertzel, 1962), per­
sonality structure (Munsterberg and Mussen, 1953), and strong 
motivational states (Maddi and Berne, 196i|.), all factors relat­
ing to, but not synonymous with, conflict.
Two studies which are frequently cited in the literature 
dealt with the relationship between creativity and preference 
for cognitive complexity or cognitive simplicity (Barron 1953a) 
and creativity and personality factors (MacKinnon, 1965).
These two studies are somewhat unique in that they provide sup­
port for certain aspects of both Freud's and Rogers' positions.
The literature contains considerably more support for the 
Rogerian than for the Freudian position. However, as with the 
studies found in support of Freud, most of the studies in sup­
port of Rogers did not deal specifically with the role of con­
flict in creativity, but rather with the relationship between 
creativity and such factors as psychological adjustment (McRey­
nolds, Acker, and Pietila, 1961; Fried, 196^), personal and in­
tellectual functioning (Barron, 1957; Reid, King, and Wickwire,
1959), life styles (Golann, 1962), frustration (Hinton, 1968), 
anxiety (Guenther, 1966; Fleischer, 196#; Zdep, 1966), stress
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(Tortorella, 1967), personality integration (Stein and Me ere, 
1924), and defensiveness (Bowers, 196#). Only one study 
(Vogel, 1968) specifically dealt with the role of conflict in 
creativity, and it was this study which provided the basis for 
this investigation. However, in contrast to the Vogel study, 
the present research attempted to more adequately control for 
intellectual variables, and to more adequately demonstrate 
whether or not an actual state of conflict was generated in 
experimental Ss.
The subject population in this research was also different 
from Vogel's in that, in contrast to Vogel's use of highly re­
ligious Ss, religion was not a factor in the selection of Ss. 
This served the purpose of testing the extent to which Vogel's 
findings could be generalized to a somewhat more representa­
tive population. In addition, conflict of a non-sexual or non­
religious nature was generated in an attendît to avoid the con­
founding of arousal due to conflict with arousal due to sexual 
stimulation. Kon-sexual or non-religious generation of con­
flict was also chosen as a means of determining the extent to 
which creativity is affected by the manner in which conflict is 
induced (sexual-religious versus perceptual-interpersonal).
Experimentally Induced Anxiety 
The Asch Situation
The issue in the classic Asch experiments (Asch, 1922, 1926) 
was a perceptual judgment on the length of lines. The S was
confronted with the fact that his own perceptions were in con­
flict with those of the group, the situation in which the S 
found himself in disagreement with the group in regard to judg­
ments on length of lines was found to produce intense conflict. 
In describing the behavior of the average S, Asch wrote :
After the first one or two disagreements, he 
would note certain changes in the manner and pos­
ture of this person. He would see a look of per­
plexity and bewilderment come over this subject's 
face at the contradicting judgments of the entire 
group. Often he becomes more active; he fidgets 
in his seat and changes the position of his head 
to look at the lines from different angles. He 
may turn around and whisper to his neighbor se­
riously or smile sheepishly. He may suddenly stand 
up to look more closely at the card. At other 
times he may become especially quiet and immobile 
(1952, p. 454).
The disagreement with the majority which first produced the 
series of reactions described above, eventually aroused a num­
ber of emotional reactions centering around the self.
As the disagreement persisted many began to 
wonder whether it signified a defect in them­
selves. They found it painful to be (as they 
imagined) the focus of attention, in addition 
to which they feared exposure of their weak­
ness which they suspected the group would dis­
approve. These circumstances fostered an op­
pressive sense of loneliness which increased in 
prominence as the subjects contrasted their sit­
uation with the apparent assurance and solidar­
ity of the majority (Asch, 1956, p. 32).
In further describing the impact of this experience upon the 
subject, Asch wrote:
The evidence cited above indicates that gen­
erally the subjects acted as if something of 
consequence were at stake and that neither 
independence nor compliance were trifling mat-
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ters. Ooncern, doubt, and temptation were the 
prevailing reactions and were expressed in 
terms of fairly strong emotion. The fact seems 
to be that the circumstances quickly gained 
an import that went beyond the immediate task 
(1956, pp. 35-36).
The following statement by Asch suggests that the conflict 
generated by the e:qperiraental situation was not soon relieved 
or resolved:
The interview followed directly upon the 
conclusion of the experimental session. During 
the greater part of the interview, the subject 
was still under the stress that the experimental 
conditions had created (1956, p. 25).
Jahoda (1959) in her comprehensive review of the literature 
in the area of conformity, concluded that only in a situation 
where the subject is ego involved will his "effectiveness as 
a person" be demonstrated. Thus "emotional and intellectual 
investment in the issue" is seen as essential in regard to any 
test of independent behavior. Of Asch’s classic studies, 
Jahoda wrote:
This series of experiments is outstanding 
in several ways, but particularly in relation 
to one point which, perhaps, Asch himself has 
not sufficiently emphasized. In addition to 
the conventional statistical treatment of the 
variations in his basic design, there is hidden 
in his data a perfect correlation of +1, a re­
sult of 100 per cent, vâiich it will be admitted, 
is a rarity in psychological research. The im­
plicit result I refer to is the creation of in­
tense conflict in all his experimental subjects.
The evidence for this result comes from the in­
terview Asch conducted with all his subjects 
after the experiment (1958, p. 110).
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Brown (1965) agrees with Jahoda:
One can see the power of the Asch situation 
in the distress^ of subjects who are in the 
presence of a false majority (p. 6?1).
Brown (1965) cites the work of Bogdonoff, Klein, Estes, Shaw, 
and Black (1961) who found that an increase in the level of 
plasma-free fatty acids (FPA) (considered to be an index of 
CMS arousal) accompanied the confrontation of naive subjects 
with majority opposition in a modified Asch type situation.
It was also found that for subjects who yielded to the majority 
(thus reducing or eliminating the conflict), there was a reduc­
ed increase in the level of acids. However, for those who re­
sisted the majority (and conflict remained unreduced) the in­
crease in the level of acids remained unmodified. The correla­
tion found between the decrease of FPA levels and conformity 
is .63; pX.05 (N=36). These findings suggest that yielding to 
the majority resulted in a reduction in level of conflict, 
whereas resisting the majority may have resulted in an unre­
duced level of conflict.
The question arises as to why the intensity and universality 
of conflict in subjects in the Asch situation. In an attempt 
to answer this question, Asch wrote :
The answer touches upon the role and function 
of concensus in social life. Our procedure pro-
^While "distress" is not synonymous with conflict, it may be 
used to describe a reaction to a conflict generating situation.
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duced a failure of concensus where it was least 
understood and expected, tending to turn disa­
greement into a more ultimate kind of contradic­
tion. Now concensus, especially on fundamental 
traits of the surroundings, is the vital pre­
requisite of social action; to abolish or im­
pair it is to threaten the relations of inter­
dependence which ordinarily experience contin­
ually validates. It is in these terras that we 
propose to account for the strength of the re­
actions which the present situation produced.
Although ostensibly the disagreement centered 
on very specific and limited data, it acquired a 
wider import. It signified to the critical sub­
jects that they were at odds with a majority 
about a basic relation in the world (1965, p. 66).
Published data are unanimously supportive of Asch’s claims 
regarding the intense level of conflict generated in his sub­
jects. Thus the Asch situation appeared to be an ideal method 





Forty white males between the ages of 18 and 22 years serv­
ed as Ss. They were drawn from the freshman class at a lerge 
state university in the southwest and selected on the basis of 
scores on the American College Test (ACT) and grade point aver­
age (GPA) after approximately one semester (ll+ to 23 accumu­
lated hours of college credit). In an attempt to eliminate 
significant differences in level of academic achievement, only 
students scoring in the midrange of both the ACT and GPA were 
selected. Midrange on the ACT was considered to extend from 
18 to 25. The mean and median ACT Composite score for stu­
dents at this particular university is 22. The standard de­
viation was not available for 1968-69 freshmen. Midrange on 
the GPA was considered to extend from 1.90 to 22.10. The mean 
GPA at this university is 2.0. Again, the standard deviation 
was not available. Approximately 99 of 1600 freshman males 
at the university from which the sample was drawn fell in the 
midrange on both the ACT and GPA. Of these, a random sample 
of i}.0 were contacted and asked to participate in this research. 
The only information provided Ss prior to the experiment was 
that they had been randomly selected, and that the experiment 
would require approximately an hour of their time. Only five 
potential Ss refused to participate. In each of these cases,
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another S was selected randomly from the remaining names on 
the list. Ss did receive extra credit (bonus points) for their 
participation in the research. The 1|0 Ss were then randomly 
divided into experimental and control groups. The mean ACT Com­
posite score was 21.60 for the experimental group, and 21.65 
for controls (t=.0?l6, df=38, p=NS). The mean GPA was 2.00 
for both the experimental and control groups. The mean age 
was 18.65 for the experimental group, and 18,70 for controls 
(t=.2980, df=38, p=NS).
Measures of Creativity
Alternate Uses Test> This test was developed by Guilford 
(1959) and is a revised and improved form of the Unusual Uses 
Test which was designed as a measure of a hypothesized factor 
of flexibility of thinking. Several factor analytic studies 
of the Alternate Uses Test have yielded significant loadings 
in the factor termed "spontaneous flexibility," the essential 
feature of which has been found to be the ability to produce 
a variety of class ideas. It is a timed twelve minute test, 
with four minutes allowed for responding to each of the three 
parts of the test (each part containing three items). Each 
item presents the name of a well-known object and a statement 
of its common use. The examinee is to list as many as six 
other less common uses (see Appendix B).
The Alternate Uses Test is scored for both productivity and 
originality, although this study is mainly concerned with the
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originality score. The productivity score is simply the num­
ber of acceptable alternate uses provided by each S, Credit 
is given for an original response if it is acceptable and if 
it is mentioned no more than three times by all the Ss. Re­
ported reliability estimates (Guilford, 1959) extend from .68 
to .81. A construct validity study (Guilford, 1959) yielded 
a validity coefficient of .51.
Consequences Test. This test (Guilford, 1959) purports to 
measure the ability to produce remote or uncommon responses. 
Factor analytic studies have consistently yielded a substan­
tial correlation with the factor identified as "originality." 
This factor has been defined as "the ability to produce re­
motely associated, clever, or uncommon responses." The test 
has also been found to be a measure of the factor "ideational 
fluency." It is a timed ten minute test, with one minute al­
lowed for responding to each of the ten test items. Each item 
is framed as a question, beginning: "What would be the results
if ..." (see Appendix C). The content of the items was chosen 
so as to bring the problem within the common knowledge of 
most individuals growing up in the United States. Responses 
are classified as being either "obvious" or "remote" in ac­
cordance with a manual of acceptable responses provided by 
the authors. An "obvious response" is defined as one indicat­
ing an immediate result in terms of a cessation of usual func­
tions, or absence of commonly associated things, with less a- 
wareness of social, economic, or cultural ramifications. For
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example, an "obvious response" to the question, "What would 
happen if all humans lost the ability to reproduce" would be 
"the species would eventually die out." The number of "remote 
responses" is considered to provide a score for originality 
and it is this score with i/Aiich the present study is mainly 
concerned. A "remote response" is defined as one indicating 
consideration of more distant temporal or geographical changes, 
or a specific substitute, a new system, or some other fairly 
specific manner of adjusting to the changed situation. Re­
sponses merely indicating the need for adjustment or those 
providing relatively vague solutions are considered "obvious" 
as opposed to "remote."
The reported alternate forms reliability coefficient for 
the "obvious" score is ,87. For the "remote" score, it is 
.67. Reported construct validity for the "obvious" score is 
.62. For the "remote" score, it is .^ .0. The fact that no es­
timates of interater reliabilities are available for either 
score is felt to constitute a serious deficiency of the in­
strument as far as its reliability and validity are concerned.
Scoring of Creativity Tests. Both sets of tests were scor­
ed by three Ph.D. psychologists who were naive in regard to 
which group (experimental or control) the Ss belonged. Only 
those responses regarding which two of the three judges, or 
all three of the judges considered creative, were scored as 
creative responses. Interater reliability was tested using
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the tetrachoric calculations as approximated from the Chesire, 
Saffir, and Thurstone Table (1933). The average interater re­
liability for the Consequences Test was found to be .92. With 
regard to the Alternate Uses Test, it was found ttat the val­
ues or cuts were too extreme (less than i^o responses were cre­
ative, while over 9^^ of the responses were non-creative) to 
warrant confidence in the tetrachoric calculation (McNemar,
I960), and no other statistical technique was deemed appro­
priate to deal with the data. However, interater agreement 
appeared quite high, and in view of the fact that the same 
three raters rated both tests, it seems probable that the in­
terater reliability for the Alternate Uses Test was also high.
Definition of Creativity. For purposes of this research, 
creativity was defined as the scores attained on the Original 
Uses part of the Alternate Uses Test, and on the Remote Con­
sequences part of the Consequences Test,
Measures of Conflict
Galvanic Skin Response (GSR). It was assumed, on the basis 
of the literature, that Ss could be placed in a state of con­
flict when confronted with disagreement from the remainder of 
the group on a matter which appears to be so clear-cut as to 
preclude the possibility of disagreement.
When two groups are undergoing apparently similar experi­
ences with the exception that in the one group, experimental-
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ly induced conflict (the Asch situation) is introduced, it 
might be assumed an increased arousal state might be antici­
pated in the experimental group. In order to obtain the de­
gree of physiological arousal accompanying this expected state 
of conflict, a measure of skin conductance or galvanic skin 
response (GSR) was used. The galvanic skin response is a 
change in the r esistance of the skin to the flow of cell ac­
tivity generated electrical current. Decreased resistance of 
the skin is considered to be characteristic of a state of a- 
lertness and arousal (Morgan and King, 1966), Many researchers 
and writers consider the galvanic skin response to be a sensi­
tive index of activation or arousal (Woodworth and Schlos- 
berg, 1924; Young, 1961). The instrument for measuring GSR in 
the present study consisted of a direct reading constant volt­
age conductance meter in which one volt was applied to two 
masked skin sights on the tips of the thumb and first finger 
of the S's non-preferred hand. Current was measured with a 
transisterized anqplifier and ammeter in micromils. Skin con­
ductance measures were obtained on all 40 Ss (both experimen­
tal and control Ss) at periodic intervals throughout the ex­
perimental session (beginning with the completion of the read­
ing of instructions to the Asch situation, before and after 
each of the 18 trials of the Asch situation, and at two minute 
intervals throughout the completion of both tests of creativ­
ity).
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Self-report Conflict Scale. This instrument (see Appendix 
A) was included as a measure of the extent of conscious con­
flict experienced by Ss during the experimental and control 
situations. It consisted of a point scale in which the 8 in­
dicated the extent to which he experienced conflict, ranging 
from extreme conflict to extreme lack of conflict, at seven 
critical points during the session. These were during relax­
ation, reading of instructions, discrimination of lengths of 
lines, performance of the first task, performance of the sec­
ond task, upon completion of both tasks, and "right now" (near 
the completion of the scale). The 8 also indicated at which 
of the seven critical points during the session, conflict, if 
experienced at all, began to subside, and completely subsided. 
Vogel (1968) found that such a conflict scale differentiated 
between his experimental (conflicted) and control (non-con- 
flicted) groups at the .001 level.
Procedure
Conflict was generated in Ss composing the experimental 
group by means of the Asch (1952, 1956) situation. Ss in the 
control group were handled in a manner similar to Asch’s hand­
ling of his control groups; however, in the present study, 
pains were taken to minimize conflict in the control situation. 
Ss in both the experimental and control groups were introduced 
to the situation in the same manner. In both cases, the group 
consisted of four persons, three members of "the majority,"
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and the S. The three persons composing the majority, unbe­
known to the S, were confederates of the experimenter. The 
same three individuals served in this capacity in both the ex­
perimental and control groups for all ij.0 Ss. The majority con­
sisted of three males, two freshmen age 18, and a sophomore 
age 19, all students attending the same university as the Ss. 
They were paid for their participation. The majority consisted 
of three persons because it has been found that the strength 
of the conformity effect increases only up to a majority of 
three confederates. Beyond that value, increasing the size of 
the majority results in no further significant increments in 
conformity (Asch, 19^1; Rosenberg, 1961).
In the experimental situation, the majority cooperated with 
the experimenter by giving, at certain times, unanimously 
wrong responses to the comparison of length of lines task. In 
the control situation, the majority cooperated with the exper­
imenter by responding unanimously with that response (correct 
or incorrect) given by the S. The members of the majority met 
with the experimenter several times prior to the running of 
Ss. They were instructed in the manner described by Asch 
(1956). The aim of the experiment was fully explained to them 
and their role was carefully rehearsed in a series of trial 
runs. They were instructed to act in a natural way, and to 
give the ingression that they were new to the situation, and 
that they had had no previous contact with the experimenter. 
The experimenter acted as an impartial chairman. He conducted
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the proceedings in a matter of fact way, reading the instruc­
tions, presenting the stimulus materials, and recording the 
announced estimates. When dissident Judgments were given, the 
experimeter listened and recorded them without any show of 
surprise. He did indicate his awareness of the disagreement, 
and occasionally would look in the direction of the Sj how­
ever, he attempted to refrain from exerting pressure in addi­
tion to that which was already contained in the situation it­
self. The examiner’s presence seemed to help to discourage 
discussion and other undesirable interruptions.
It was arranged so that all members of the group (S and 
confederates) arrived at the designated room at approximately 
the same time. After being greeted by the examiner, they were 
seated in a row. In the experimental situation, the S was 
Jockeyed into the third seat (with one member of the majority 
on his left, and the other two on his right), so that he was 
the third to respond. In the control situation, the S was 
Jockeyed into the first seat, so that he was the first to re­
spond. On the few occasions when attempts to Jockey the S in­
to the designated chair failed, the examiner informed the 
group that they would be seated randomly. He then told the 
group that he had picked a number between one and ten, and 
that the person who responded with the number closest to that 
number would be seated in the first chair. This procedure was 
followed until all were in their designated places.
Upon having been seated, the four group members were fitted
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with the electrodes used to monitor skin conductance. While 
all four were fitted with identical electrodes, only those 
connected to the S were plugged into the conductance meter and 
were operating. The meter itself was shielded from the view 
of the group by a cardboard box which allowed convenient read­
ing by the experimenter. The electrodes from all four mem­
bers led into the box; however, those connected to the three 
members of the majority were merely taped to the inside of the 
cardboard box.
After all group members were fitted with the electrodes, 
they were instructed to relax for a period of ten minutes. The 
purpose of the relaxation period was to establish a basal GSR 
reading, the latter consisting of the mean of three readings 
taken after 8, 9, and 10 minutes of relaxation.
Immediately following the ten minute relaxation period, the 
experimenter introduced the Asoh situation by placing two 
white cards on a shelf situated 10^ inches directly in front 
of the group. (The experimenter was unable to find any men­
tion in Asch's publications as to the exact distance between 
the group and the cards. From Asch's description of the ex­
perimental situation, 10i| inches was estimated to be the ap­
propriate distance used in his work). Vertical black (tape) 
lines ^ inch wide were pasted on the 1?^ x 6 inch white cards. 
The cards used in this study were the same size as those used 
by Asch, as were the lengths of the lines appearing on them. 
However, the width of the lines differed {3 inch in the Asch
69
studies, 2^ inch this study) due to the unavailability of tape 
in the J’ inch width. The card on the left (from the vantage 
point of the group) carried the standard line while the card 
on the right carried the three comparison lines which were 
numbered 1, 2, and 3 from left to right. The three comparison 
lines on the card on the right differed in length. One of 
them was equal to the standard line on the card at the left; 
and the other two differed from the standard and from each oth­
er by varying amounts (see Pig. 1 and Table 1). The standard 
and its matched comparison line were separated by a distance 
of 1|.0 inches (Asch, 19^6), and the two cards were placed so 
that the first and fourth members of the group were equidis­
tant from the card nearest them.
After having placed the two white cards on the shelf in 
front of the group, the experimenter read to the group the fol­
lowing instructions:
The task which you are about to do involves the 
discrimination of lengths of lines. Before you is 
a pair of cards. On the left is a card with one 
line; the card on the right has three lines differ­
ing in length; they are numbered 1, 2, and 3> in or­
der. One of the three lines at the right is equal 
to the standard line at the left. You will decide 
in each case which is the equal line. You will 
state your judgment in terms of the number of the 
line. There will be 18 such con^arisons in all.
As the number of comparisons is few, and the group 
small, I will call upon each of you in turn to announce 
your judgments, which I shall record here on a pre­
pared form. Please be as accurate as possible. Sup­
pose you give me your estimates in order, starting at 
the right and proceeding to the left. Upon comple­
tion of this ("session" in the experimental situation, 
"task" in the control situation), you will be given 
the correct answers.
70
Standard Line Comparison Lines
Fig. 1. A sample con^arlson
The cards on which the lines appeared were 17-1/2 Inches 
by 6 Inches. The lines had a standard width of l/i|. Inch; 
their lower ends were 2-1/2 Inches from the lower edge of 
the cards. Standard lines appeared In the center of the 
card while conq)arlson lines were seperated by distances of 
1-3/4 Inches. The numbering of the lines was done with black 
gum figures 3/4 Inches long. They were placed l/2 Inch di­
rectly beneath the base of each line.
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TAEIE I
Majority Responses to Standard and Con^arison 












1* 7 1/2 ^ 2 3/4 7 1/2 0
2* 5 6 1/2 7 5 0
3 8 8 2 6 1
k 3 1/2 3 3/4 5 3 1/2 1/4
S* 9 7 9 11 0
6 6 1/2 6 1/2 5 1/4 7 1/2 1
7 5 1/2 4 1/2 5 1/2 4 1
8* 1 3/4 2 3/4 3 1/4 1 3/4 0
9 2 1/2 4 2 1/2 3 3/8 7/8
10 8 1/2 8 1/2 10 1/4 11 1 3/4
11* 11 3 1 2 1/4 0
12 4 1/2 4 1/2 3 1/2 ? 1/2 1
13* 7 1/2 5 5 3/4 7 1/2 0
14* 5 6 1/2 7 5 0
1^ 8 8 2 6 1
16 3 1/2 3. 3/4 5 3 1/2 1/4
17* 9 7 9 11 0
18 6 1/2 6 1/2 5 1/4 7 1/2 1
the majority responded correctly. All other trials were 
"critical," i.e., the majority responded incorrectly.
Underlined figures designate the incorrect majority re­
sponses.
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Immediately following the reading of instructions, a skin 
conductance reading was taken. Four seconds later, another 
pre-trial reading was taken, and the first group member (on 
the experimenter's far left - a confederate in the experimen­
tal situation, the S in the control situation) was asked to 
start off the announcement of judgments. Immediately after the 
last group member (on the experimenter's far right - always a 
confederate) announced his judgment, a post-trial skin conduct­
ance reading was taken. The first two cards were then removed 
and replaced by the next pair of cards with different standard 
and comparison lines. There were 18 sets of standard and com­
parison lines in all. Skin conductance readings were obtained 
immediately before the first member of the group announced his 
judgment and immediately after the fourth member announced his, 
on all 18 trials. Thus there were 36 readings taken during 
this portion of the experimental session.
In an effort to maximize and maintain conflict in experimen­
tal 8s, and to minimize conflict in control Ss, a differential 
feedback system was used. In the control situation, after the 
l8th and last perceptual judgment trial, the group was inform­
ed that their judgments had been without errors (whether or 
not there were, in fact, any errors). In the experimental sit­
uation, after the l8th trial, the group was reminded that upon 
the completion of the experimental session, they would be giv­
en the correct answers to the perceptual judgment task.
Immediately after the above differential feedback was given.
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the first of two measures of creativity was administered (to 
all members of both the experimental and control groups). The 
first creativity measure to be administered was the Alternate 
Uses Test. A copy of the test and a pencil were placed before 
each of the four group members. The group was then instructed 
as follows:
Please write your name in the place provided 
at the top of the first page, and then read the 
instructions. When you understand the instruc­
tions, let me know by looking up at me. If you 
have any questions about the instructions, I 
will try to answer them.
When the group indicated that they understood the instruc­
tions and were ready to begin, the experimenter indicated that 
they should turn to Part I and begin working. Twelve minutes 
later the completed Alternate Uses Test was collected and the 
second measure of creativity, the Consequences Test, was pro­
vided. The group was given the same instructions for this 
test as for the Alternate Uses Test. Throughout both tests, 
skin conductance readings were obtained at two minute inter­
vals, beginning at zero minutes into the test, and ending at 
the termination of the test's allotted time.
Immediately following the completion of the Consequences 
Test, the test booklet was collected, and a copy of the Likert 
Conflict Scale was passed out. The following instructions were 
given:
Please write your name at the top of the page 
and fill it out according to the instructions. If 
there are any questions about the instructions, I 
will try to answer them.
7i^
The completed Likert Conflict Scale was then collected, and 
the group was directed to remove the skin conductance elec­
trodes. In the control situation, the group was thanked for 
their cooperation and dismissed. In the experimental situa­
tion, as the group was removing the electrodes, the experimen­
ter said: "I noticed that there were some differences in
your answers to the discrimination of lengths of lines task." 
(pause for response) Following the group’s response to this 
statement, the experimenter addressed the S as follows: "Do
you have any idea as to why some of your answers were differ­
ent than those the others gave?" Following the S’s reply, he 
was then asked: "Do you feel that you were right or that the
others were right?" The S was then asked: "Were you aware of
making any errors or of answering differently than the way it 
really looked to you?" If the S responded that he felt he had 
made some errors, he was asked approximately how many and to 
explain how he happened to make them. At this point, if the 
S had made any errors, the trials on ^ich he erred were ad­
ministered again. This was done in an attempt to determine if 
those errors were due primarily to impaired eyesight, or to 
other factors, such as anxiety and/or group pressure. If the 
S was able to correct all or most of his original errors, it 
was assumed that his eyesight was not seriously impaired, and 
that his errors were probably due to factors such as anxiety 
and/or group pressure. The S was then asked if he had any idea 
as to the purpose of the experiment. If so, he was asked to
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explain. If, at this point, there was still some doubt as 
to whether or not the S "saw through" the experiment, he was 
asked the following additional questions: (a) "Did you sus­
pect that the group intended to affect your judgment?" If the 
answer to the above question was to the affirmative, the S was 
asked:(b)"When did you first begin to feel suspicious?" and fc) 
"Did you retain this suspicion?" Ss who definitely suspected 
that the other group members were cooperating with the experi­
menter were eliminated from the study. "Definite suspicion" 
in the present study was defined as it was in Asch's studies: 
where the S is certain or nearly certain that the other group 
members were cooperating with the experimenter. "Definite 
suspicion" was considered in contrest to the suspicion which 
a number of Asch's Ss entertained as a temporary hypothesis 
at some point during the experimental session. The latter Ss 
(as was the case with Asch) were not eliminated. In the pres­
ent study, only one S had to be eliminated on the basis of his 
having suspected the nature of the experiment. None of the 
other Ss appeared to have been remotely suspicious.
If the e:q>erimenter was certain that the S did not "see 
through" the experimental situation, he explained to the 8 the 
structure of that situation and attempted to deal with any 
stress that 8 still experienced as a result of it. In view of 
the apparent intensity of the conflict generated in many of 
Asch's experimental Ss, it was deemed inport ant in the present 
study to make certain that e:qperimental Ss not be allowed to
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leave without full knowledge of what had happened. Finally, 
experimental Ss were asked: "Do you feel that this experience
was in any way beneficial, detrimental, or neither beneficial 
or detrimental?" They were also asked to keep the experiment 
in strict confidence. In turn, they were assured that the ex­
perimenter and the group would not violate their confidence.
Specific Hypotheses Tested
After reviewing the literature regarding the role of con­
flict in creativity, it was the opinion of this experimenter 
that the Rogerian position is more valid than the Freudian po­
sition.
Hypothesis I: The experimental or conflicted group evi­
dences higher level of arousal during the Asch situation, and 
during both creativity tests than does the control or non-con- 
flicted group.
Hypothesis II: The experimental or conflicted group re­
ports more conflict (lower scores) on the self-report conflict 
scale than does the control or non-conflicted group.
Hypothesis III; The experimental or conflicted group per­
forms less well on the two creativity tests than does the con­
trol or non-conflieted group.
Hypothesis JSf : Within the experimental or conflicted group,
an inverse correlation exists between level of arousal (during 
the Asch situation and during the creativity tests) and per­
formance on the creativity tests.
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Hypothesis V: Within the experimental or conflicted group,
an Inverse correlation exists between amount of yielding to 
the majority (errors In accord with those of the majority) and 
level of arousal (during the Asch situation and during the 
creativity tests).
Hypothesis VI; Within the experimental or conflicted group, 
a positive correlation exists between the amount of yielding 
(errors made In accord with the majority response) and perform­
ance on the creativity tests.
The null form of the above hypotheses had to be rejected at 
the level p ^  .0^ for one-talled tests before the positive 
form was considered "confirmed."
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA AND RESULTS
Because the statistical analysis has been specifically tai­
lored to each hypothesis, the method of presentation in this 
section will consist of a statement of the hypothesis, follow­
ed by the specific method of statistical analysis used in re­
gard to that hypothesis, and a statement of the results.
Hypothesis I
The experimental or conflicted group evidences a higher lev­
el of arousal during the Asch situation, and during both crea­
tivity tests, than does the control or non-conflicted group.
Analysis; A total of ^3 measures (readings) of arousal 
(Skin conductance) was obtained from each S: one measure at
each 8, 9, and 10 minutes into the ten minute period of relax­
ation (a mean was then derived from these three readings, and 
this was considered the basal state reading); one measure af­
ter the reading of instructions (Asch situation); one measure 
immediately before and one immediately after each of the 18 
Asch situation trials (36 in all); one measure at each 0-2-i}.- 
6-8-10 and 12 minutes into the Alternate Uses Test (seven 
readings in all); and one measure at each 0-2-ii-6-8 and 10 
minutes into the Consequences Test (six readings in all).
Each S*s basal state reading was subtracted from each of
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his subsequent readings so as tor ule out the effects of the 
variability of skin conductance.from person to person.
Means were derived for both the experimental and control 
groups for basal arousal and fifty subsequent measures. Fifty- 
one t tests after McUemar (I960) were run to determine if 
there were significant differences between the two groups.
Results; As indicated in Table 2, the above hypothesis 
was supported. The experimental or conflicted group did evi­
dence a higher level of arousal during the Asch situation and 
during both creativity tests than did the control or non-con- 
flicted group.
Hypothesis II
The experimental or conflicted group reports more conflict 
(lower scores) on the self-report conflict scale, than does 
the control or non-conflicted group.
Analysis: Self-reports of extent of conflict (see Appendix
A) were obtained from each S at seven critical points during 
the experiment: during the relaxation period, during the read­
ing of instructions, during the discrimination of lengths of 
lines, during the performance of the first task (Alternate 
Uses Test), during the performance of the second task (Con­
sequences Test), upon the completion of both of the above men­




One Tailed t Tests* Gon^arlng Mean Skin 
Conductance Readings for Experi­
mental and Control Groups
ill % J l t
Basal Readings: 19.2S 19.23 .Ol(NS)
After Instructions: 2.45 1.76 2.62 2.30 .25(NS)
Asch Situation
Pre-trial Post--trial
Trial ^ a: Mo A i. £ MB 6 Mft & £
1 2.69 1.94 2.95 2.13 -.39 NS 4.15 2.67 3.13 1.77 1.39 NS
2 3.27 2.27 3.37 2.41 -.13 NS 3.93 2.29 3.55 2.20 .52 NS
3 3.27 2.56 3.43 2.52 -.10 NS 5.21 2.72 3.27 1.71 2.64 c
4 4.31 2.59 3.20 1.90 1.50 NS 5.01 2.64 2.93 1.96 2.76 d
5 4.07 2.57 3.01 2.18 1.37 NS 4.37 2.75 2.77 1.80 2.12 b
6 3.91 2.44 2.51 1.89 1.98 a 5.11 2.43 2.69 2.04 3.33 d
7 4.19 2.44 2.61 1.93 2.22 b 5.03 2.84 2.87 2.35 2.56 c
8 4.27 2.72 2.31 1.71 2.66 c 4.53 2.74 2.31 1.56 3.08 d
9 4.11 2.82 2.33 1.62 2.40 b 5.50 2.09 2.49 1.92 4.63 e
10 4.31 2.86 2.91 2.09 1.72 a 4.79 2.57 2.59 1.66 3.13 d
11 4.01 2.74 2.55 1.98 1.88 a 4.35 2.64 2.35 1.43 2.91 d
12 3.97 2.94 2.27 1.57 2.23 b 5.31 2.84 2.57 1.56 3.69 e
13 4.17 2.62 2.27 1.65 2.68 c 4.37 2.69 2.57 1.42 2.58 c
14 4.21 2.66 2.51 1.86 2.29 b 4.39 2.87 2.63 1.37 2.41 b
15 4.05 2.87 2.69 1.81 1.75 a 4.85 2.90 2.91 1.53 2.58 c





Trial ^  jÇ ^  ;t P
16 4.IS 2.84 2»71 1.64 2.12 b
17 4.17 2.62 2.81 1.53 1.97 a
18 4.15 2.85 2.83 1.61 1.76 a
MI a  Us 1 I
4.51 2.75 3.11 1.55 1.94 a
4.33 2.68 2.89 1.75 1.96 a
5.47 3.59 3.13 1.79 2.54 c
* df = 38 on all trials 








VAL M* Æ  Me 
T M i f D ’ ■
t P Mr ^ Mo t P
0 5.85 3.34 3.99 2.31 2.00 a 8.45 4.47 5.19 3.34 2.55 c
2 5.93 3.64 4.17 3.10 1.61 US 7.95 4.98 4.81 3.37 2.28 b
4 6.43 4.31 4.41 3.28 1.63 NS 8.13 4.79 4.53 2.90 2.80 d
6 6.73 3.84 4.69 3.32 1.75 a 8.00 4.54 4.71 2.79 2.70 c
8 7.13 4.82 4.77 3.15 1.79 a 8.33 5.30 4.97 3.91 2.22 b
10 7.35 4.64 4.71 3.46 1.99 a 8.25 4.87 5.27 3.23 2.22 b
12 7.69 4.85 5.09 3.80 1.84 a
«■ df=38 on all trials 
a=P <.05 





Meaiîs were derived from the scores taken at each of the 
seven critical points, for both the experimental and control 
groups, and t tests were run to determine if there are signi­
ficant differences between the two groups at any of these sev­
en points.
In addition, the scores attained at each of the seven crit­
ical points were added together into a total score for each S. 
Mean scores were derived for* both the experimental and control 
groups, and a t test was run to determine if there was a sig­
nificant difference between the total scores of the two groups.
Resultst As shown in Table 3» the above hypothesis was not 
supported. No significant differences were found between the 
two groups in regard to either separate or total conflict 
scale scores.
Hypothesis III
The experimental or conflicted group performs less well on 
the two creativity tests than does the control or non-conflict- 
ed group.
Analysis ; Measures of creativity were the Original Uses 
score of the Alternate Uses Test, and the Remote Consequences 
score of the Consequences Test. Mann-Whitney U Tests after 
McNemar (I960) were run to determine if there are any signifi­




^ Tests Comparing Conflict Scale Scores for 
Experimental and Control Groups
Seven Critical 
Points mi- at Me # t P
a) Relaxation 4.30 1.10 4.85 1.24 1.45 NS
b) Instructions 4.45 .02 4.25 1.22 .52 NS
c) Discriminations 3.00 1.14 3.40 1.16 1.07 NS
d) First Task 2.45 .77 2.22 1.04 .67 NS
6) Second Task 2.62 1.94 2.12 .62 1.42 NS
f ) After 2nd Task 3.82 1.31 3.92 1.28 -.24 NS
g) "Right Now" 4.35 1.35 4.50 1.34 .49 NS
h) Total Likert 
Scores
25.15 5.34 25.30 1.02 -.12 NS
In order to determine whether or not there is a significant 
relationship between creativity scores (Original Uses score of 
the Alternate Uses Test, and Remote Consequences score of the 
Consequences Test) and productivity scores (Alternate Uses 
score of the Alternate Uses Test, and Obvious Consequences 
score of the Consequences Test), Pearson product moment cor­
relations were estimated between Original Uses scores (crea­
tivity) and Alternate Uses scores (productivity) on the Al­
ternate Uses Test, and between Remote Consequences scores (cre­
ativity) and Obvious Consequences scores (productivity) on the 
Consequences Test.
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Résultat As indicated in Table 4; the above hypothesis was 
not supported. The experimental or conflicted group did not 
perform less well on the two creativity tests than did the con­
trol or non-conflicted group,
TABLE 4
Mann-Whitney IJ Tests Comparing Creativity 
Test Scores for Experimental 
and Control Groups
Tests GU P*
Original Uses 187.00 NS
Remote Consequences 179.20 NS
As indicated in Table 5» there was no significant relation­
ship between Original Uses scores (creativity) and Alternate 
Uses scores (productivity) on the Alternate Uses Test, and be­
tween Remote Consequences scores (creativity) and Obvious Con­
sequences scores (productivity) on the Consequences Test.
TABLE 5
Pearson Product Moment Correlations between 
Creativity and Productivity Scores
Tests r (df=38) P
Alternate Uses .110 NS
Consequences .260 NS
*t tests also failed to reach significance
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Hypothesis IV
Within the experimental or conflicted group an inverse cor­
relation exists between level of arousal (during the Asch sit­
uation and during the creativity tests) and performance on the 
creativity tests.
Analysis; Spearman Rank-difference correlations after Sie­
gel (1926) were run between Original Uses scores (Alternate 
Uses Test) and skin conductance readings taken: a) pre-trial 
(Asch situation), b) post-trial (Asch situation), c) during 
the Alternate Uses Test, d) during the Consequences Test, and 
e) during the above four situations (a coïiç>osite). Remote 
Consequences scores were correlated in the same manner. Thus 
ten Spearman Rank-differenoe correlations were calculated in 
all.
Results: As indicated in Table 6, the above hypothesis was
not supported. Within the experimental group a significant 
inverse correlation did not exist between level of arousal and 
performance on the creativity tests.
Hypothesis V
Within the experimental or conflicted group an inverse cor­
relation exists between amount of yielding to the majority 
(errors in accord with those of the majority) and level of a- 




Spearman Rank-differenoe Correlations between Level 
of Arousal and Creativity Test Performance 
within the Experimental Group
Original Uses Scores 
Skin Conductance Readings n t P
a) pre-trial .083 .353 NS
b) post-trial .061 .259 NS
c) Alternate Uses Test .020 .085 NS
d) Consequences Test .011 .047 NS
e) composite .047 .200 NS
Remote Consequences Scores
a) pre-trial .262 1.152 NS
b) post-trial .170 .732 NS
c) Alternate Uses Test .234 1.021 NS
d) Consequences Test .205 .889 NS
e) composite -. 040 -.170 NS
AnalysesÎ Pearson product moment correlations after Siegel 
(1956) were run between the number of errors (regarding lengths 
of lines in the Asch situation) made by each of the experimen­
tal Ss, and the mean of that S*s skin conductance readings ta­
ken: a) pre-trial (Asch situation), b) post-trial (Asch situa­
tion), c) during the Alternate Uses Test, and d) during the 
Consequences Test.
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Results : As shown in Table 7, the above hypothesis was not
supported. Within the experimental or conflicted group, a sig­
nificant inverse correlation did not exist between amount of 
yielding to the majority, and level of arousal.
TABLE 7
Pearson Product Moment Correlations between 
Amount of Yielding and Level of Arousal 
within the Experimental Group
Skin Conductance r (df=l8) P
a) pre-trial -. 23 MS
b) post-trial -.13 MS
c) Alternate Uses Test -.15 MS
d) Consequences Test —. l6 MS
Hypothesis VI
Within the experimental or conflicted group a positive cor­
relation exists between amount of yielding (errors made in ac­
cord with the majority response) and performance on the crea­
tivity tests.
Analysis; Spearman Rank-differenoe correlations after Siegel 
(1956) were run between number of errors (regarding lengths of 
lines in the Asch situation) and: a) Original Uses (Alternate
Uses Test) scores, and b) Remote Consequences (Consequences 
Test) scores.
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Results : As indicated in Table 8, the above hypothesis was
partially supported in that there was a significant positive 
correlation between amount of yielding and performance on the 
Original Uses portion of the Alternate Uses Test. That is, Ss 
who evidenced greater yielding to the majority (more errors), 
performed significantly better on the Original Uses portion of 
the Alternate Uses Test.
On the other hand, a significant correlation was not found 
between amount of yielding and performance on the Remote Con­
sequences portion of the Consequences Test.
TABLE 8
Spearman Rank-difference Correlations between 
Amount of Yielding and Creativity Test 
Performance within the Experi-
mental Group
Test P t P
Original Uses (Alternate Uses) M z 2.21 .02
Remote Consequences (Conseq) .016 .07 NS
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION
Aa stated earlier, the purpose of the present study was to 
submit to empirical test the specific problem regarding the 
role of conflict in creative behavior. Freud's position was 
that creativity is both generated and facilitated by conflict. 
Rogers' position is that conflict inhibits creative behavior. 
In the present study, it was hypothesized in accord with 
Rogers' position that experimentally induced conflict would 
result in diminished creative performance.
It is clear that if there was to be any valid test of the 
above hypothesis, it was necessary to demonstrate that a state 
of conflict was induced in the experimental group. While the 
self-report conflict scale failed to differentiate the experi­
mental and control groups, the experimental group did evidence 
a significantly higher level of arousal during the Asch situa­
tion (a technique widely acknowledged to be a generator of 
conflict) and during both creativity tests, than did the con­
trol group. The higher level of arousal generated in the ex­
perimental group is assumed to be due to the Asch situation. 
This assumption is supported by the work of Bogdonoff et a] 
(1961), and more immediately, by the reports of Ss in the ex­
perimental group (of the present study) indicating that they 




The failure of the self-report conflict scale to differen­
tiate between the experimental and control groups may be ac­
counted for on the basis of one or both of the following fac­
tors: a) The actual level of conflict induced may not have
been available to awareness due to the operation of repressive 
defensive mechanisms, and b) The instrument itself may have 
been inadequate. While Vogel (1968) found that a similar scale 
successfully differentiated between his experimental (con­
flicted) and control (non-conflieted) groups, both his manner 
of generating conflict (sexual-religious) and his subject pop­
ulation (religious Ss) were different from those in the pres­
ent study. In addition, the self-report conflict scale is a 
non-standardized instrument, without demonstrated validity or 
reliability. It was used In the present study in the absence 
of a suitable standardized instrument.
While it appears that significantly more conflict was gener­
ated in the experimental group than in the control group, the 
two groups could not be differentiated in regard to perform­
ance on the creativity tests. In addition, within the experi­
mental group, an inverse correlation was not found between lev­
el of arousal and creativity test performance. These results 
fail to support either the Freudian or the Rogerian position 
regarding the role of conflict in creativity. It is possible 
that conflict possesses minimal consequences in regard to 
either facilitation or inhibition of creative behavior. How­
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ever, in view of the extensive literature supporting both the 
Freudian and Rogerian positions, and particularly, the consid­
erable acceptable empirical studies supporting the latter po­
sition, such an explanation of the present study's failure to 
obtain significant results does not appear to be indicated.
It seems that the above results can be accounted for more 
plausibly and parsimoniously on the basis of lack of theoreti­
cal refinement, experimental factors, or a combination of the 
two. For exanple, it is possible that the amount or extent of 
conflict experimentally induced was not sufficient to inter­
fere with creative functioning. Certainly the comments of 
Jahoda (19^9), Brown (196^), and the work of Bogdonoff et al 
(1961), not to mention Asch's (19^2, 19^6) own estimation of 
the power of the Asch situation to generate conflict, all tend 
to argue against the possibility that the quantity, amount, or 
extent of conflict generated by the Asoh situation was not suf­
ficient to affect functioning. However, it is not known what 
extent of conflict is necessary to interfere with, or facili­
tate creative functioning.
At a clinical level, while some experimental Ss in the pres­
ent study were observed to behave in a manner described by 
Asch (19^2, 1956), just as many Ss behaved in ways which did 
not suggest the extent of upset inferred by Asch in regard to 
his Ss. It is possible that the difference in observed reac­
tion, if indeed there was such a difference, was not reflec­
tive of a difference in quantity or extent of conflict gener-
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afced In both cases, but rather of a difference in regard to 
expression of the experienced conflict in overt behavior. In 
other words, it is possible that Asch's Ss were more expres­
sive of their inner state than those in the present study. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that Asch's Ss' overt be­
havior was reflective of an eagerness or felt need to please 
by expressing what they sensed was the expected and/or desir­
ed response to the situation. Thus, there is some possibility 
that Asch tended to overestimate the extent of conflict gener­
ated by his classic situation. This possibility may receive 
some support from a close examination of Asch's attenç>t to ac­
count for the apparent intensity and universality of conflict 
in Ss exposed to the Asch situation. He wrote:
The answer touches upon the role and function 
of concensus in social life. Our procedure pro­
duced a failure of concensus where it was least 
understood and expected, tending to turn disagree­
ment into a more ultimate kind of contradiction.
Now concensus, especially on fundamental traits of 
the surroudings, is the vital prerequisite of soc­
ial action; to abolish or impair it is to threaten 
the relations of interdependence which ordinarily 
experience continually validates. It is in these 
terms that we propose to account for the strength 
of the reactions which the present situation pro­
duced. Although ostensibly the disagreement cen­
tered on very specific and limited data, it ac­
quired a wider import. It signified to the crit­
ical subjects that they were at odds with a maj­
ority about a basic relation in the world (19^6,
p. 66).
The above statement impresses the writer as a rather gener­
ous statement of the powers of the Asch situation. It might 
be argued that only in the severely unstable and pathological
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personality, could the Asch situation precipitate such pro­
found self-doubt and intense anxiety.
In addition to quantity or amount of conflict, another var­
iable which may have played a part in the present study's 
failure to obtain significant results, is quality or kind of 
conflict. Certainly, no arbitrary distinction can be made as 
to where quantity of conflict ends and quality of conflict be­
gins; however, an attempt at such a distinction may be useful. 
For example, it is possible that the Asch situation did indeed 
generate intense conflict, but a quality or kind of conflict 
which does not affect creative functioning. And it follows 
that while the Asch situation may generate conflict of anple 
quantity and quality to interfere with creativity, that par­
ticular conflict may be of a quantity and quality which tends 
not to affect creative functioning as required by the two cre­
ativity tests used in the present study. In other words, it 
is possible that induced conflict of a sexual-religious nature 
produces sufficient quantity and quality of conflict to sig­
nificantly affect creative functioning on the two creativity 
tests used in both the present study and Vogel's (1968) study, 
and that the kind of induced conflict used in the present study 
did not produce sufficient quantity and quality of conflict to 
affect functioning on the creativity tests used.
Closely related to both quantity and quality conflict, is 
depth of conflict. There is a possibility that for creative 
functioning to be affected, conflict must exist at a much
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deeper (unconscious), level than that precipitated by the Asch 
situation. An example of deep unconscious conflict might be 
conflict detween id and superego, or conflict regarding recog­
nition, acceptance, or expression of deepseated unacceptable 
impulses, or conflict centering around love and hate concern­
ing one's self and/or others, or conflict between one's will 
to live and one's will to die, or possibly conflict of a sex­
ual-religious nature as in Vogel's (1968) study. These are 
the kinds or depths of conflicts usually referred to in the 
literature, and it may require a conflict of such depth to in­
terfere appreciably with creative functioning. Of course, it 
is not ethically desirable to generate such conflict in a lab­
oratory situation. Yet, if it were possible to demonstrate 
that experimentally induced conflict at a more superficial or 
conscious level could interfere with creative functioning, 
such a finding would certainly lend support to the position 
which holds that severe personality conflicts are likely to 
interfere with creative functioning.
Another possible explanation for the present study's fail­
ure to obtain significant results, is the possible inadequacy 
or insensitivity of the creativity tests used. There is a 
paucity of acceptable measures of creativity primarily because 
of the diversity of opinions as to what kinds of behavior can 
be appropriately labeled "creative" and the subjectivity in­
volved in making such a decision. While the measures used in 
the present study appeared to be two of the more promising of
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such instruments, they have not yet been widely used and ques­
tions as to their validity and reliability remain to be ans­
wered. It is important, however, to note that Vogel (1968) 
did obtain some significant data using these instruments.
One problem with these tests which became apparent concerns 
instructions with regard to scoring on both the Alternate Uses 
and the Consequences Tests. The scoring criteria were suffic­
iently strict that very few of the Ss’ responses passed the 
creative criteria, A close examination of the scoring criteria 
for both tests suggested that the strictness lay in the scor­
ing instructions rather than in the judges misinterpretation 
of the scoring instructions. The average number of creative 
responses for the Alternate Uses Test was lJ4.71. The range 
extended from zero to five creative responses with only two 
Ss achieving five creative responses. The average number of 
creative responses for the Consequences Test was 5*630. The 
range extended from one to fourteen with only one S achieving 
fourteen creative responses. The very limited number and the 
extremely restricted range of creative responses, particularly 
on the Alternate Uses Test, made for problems with regard to 
statistical treatment of the data. Because of the limited num­
ber and restricted range of creative responses, a tetrachoric 
correlation could not be run in regard to the Alternate Uses 
Test in order to determine interater reliability. In addition, 
the same factors worked against the obtaining of significant 
statistical correlations, particularly in regard to the Alter­
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nate Uses Test. Thus a more liberal set of scoring instruc­
tions would have resulted in a greater number, and a less re­
stricted range of creative responses which, in turn, would 
likely have facilitated statistically the appearance of a true 
effect if such were present. Therefore, it is possible that 
this factor (the very limited number and range of creative 
responses) alone was primarily responsible for the present 
study’s lack of significant results.
In addition to the aforementioned findings, there were sev­
eral interesting results which deserve mention, particularly 
in that they suggest directions for future research. Vogel 
(1968) found that while conflict adversely affected perform­
ance on tasks measuring originality (creativity), it did not 
adversely affect performance on tasks measuring productivity. 
In the present study, it was found that the experimental group 
produced significantly more responses on the Obvious Conse­
quences (productivity) portion of the Consequences Test, than 
did the control group, (CU=107.5 p=.02 df=l8, 2tail). This 
finding suggests that certain amounts and kinds of conflict 
may not only not interfere with performance on tasks measuring 
or involving productivity (as opposed to creativity), but may 
actually facilitate productivity. This phenomenon may corres­
pond with a not uncommon clinical phenomenon referred to as 
"flight into activity," wherein a person copes with conflicts 
and resulting anxiety by means of heightened, and often pro­
ductive activity.
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The facilitation of productivity by a conflict state is per­
haps at least partially explained by Spence (1959), who views 
heightened drive states (such as that caused by conflict) as 
energizing or strengthening responses which are dominant in 
the response hierarchy, i.e., have a higher probability of oc- 
curing, and inç)airing the emission of non-dominant or unusual 
responses. Future research might be directed toward determin­
ing whether or not, or to what extent, conflict states of vary­
ing kinds and intensities facilitate various kinds of produc­
tivity (as opposed to creativity).
Another interesting finding is the partial support found 
for hypothesis 6 (see Table 8). While a significant correla­
tion was not found between amount of yielding and performance 
on the Remote Consequences portion of the Consequences Test, 
there was a significant positive correlation between amount of 
yielding and performance on the Original Uses portion of the 
Alternate Uses Test. That is, Ss who yielded more frequently 
to the majority performed significantly better on the Alternate 
Uses Test. This finding argues against ruling out the possi­
bility of the existence of an inverse correlation between level 
of conflict and creative performance. A replication or modi­
fication of the present study might help to clarify the problem.
The present study has served to raise questions which can 
only be answered by future research. A basic problem which 
creativity related research will be struggling with for some 
time is in regard to defining creativity. One of the problems
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in creativity related research has to do with the failure of 
many researchers to define creativity as used in their particu­
lar study, and especially to provide an operational definition.
Closely related to the problem of defining creativity is 
that of measures of creativity themselves. Certainly research 
in the area will only be as valid and reliable as the measures 
used. Current measures, such as the ones used in the present 
study, must undergo further validity and reliability studies, 
and new and more innovative measures requiring less subjectiv­
ity must be developed.
Replication of Vogel's (1968) study is recommended to assess 
the validity and reliability of the results. The present study 
has raised questions centering around amount, kind, and/or 
depth of conflict. Replications of the present study would 
also be desirable as a means of assessing the reliability of 
the results, thereby helping to determine their validity and 
generalizability. Other studies might attempt to determine the 
amount, kind, and/or depth of conflict necessary to interfere 
with creativityj Such studies might use various methods of in­
ducing conflict in "normals." Assuming a substantial relation­
ship between states of pathology and conflict, still other 
studies might involve Ss with varying degrees of pathology, 
ranging from extreme pathology (psychoses) to mild pathology 
(neurosis). Control groups might include "normals" and/or 
conspicuously effective individuals. In addition, various 
types of promising creativity measures might be used. And,
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finally, the three main variables discussed, namely subject 
population, method of conflict generation, and creativity meas­
ures, might be manipulated in an effort to understand tl» rule 
of conflict in creative behavior.
CHAPTER VI 
SUM-IARY
The purpose of the present research was to submit to empir­
ical test the contrasting positions of Freud and Rogers, re­
garding the role of conflict in creative behavior. Freud’s 
position was that creativity is both generated and facilitated 
by conflict. Rogers’ position is that conflict inhibits cre­
ative behavior. It was hypothesized, in accord with Rogers’ 
position that conflict would result in diminished creative 
performance.
The Ss were i;0 white, university freshmen males, ages 18 to 
22, selected on the basis of midrange scores on the American 
College Test (ACT) and grade point average (GPA), after ap­
proximately one semester of college credit. The Ss were ran­
domly divided into experimental and control groups,
A state of conflict was induced in the experimental group 
by means of the classic Asch situation; while in the control 
group, conflict was reduced to a minimum by means of a modi­
fied Asch situation. Immediately following the Asch situation, 
Ss were administered two standardized creativity tests.
In spite of the fact that the experimental group evidenced 
higher levels of arousal as measured by GSR, no significant 
differences were found between experimental and control groups 
with regard to performance on the creativity tests. Within 
the experimental group, no significant inverse correlation was
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found between level of arousal and creativity test performance.
Results failed to support either the Freudian or the Roger- 
ian position regarding the role of conflict in creative behav­
ior. Several possible explanations for the present study's 
failure to obtain significant results were offered, and pos­
sible productive directions for future research were dis­
cussed.
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In the conrae of the experimental session, I experienced 
the following state of conflict:
1 2 3 h $ 6
slight moderate extreme
extreme moderate slight lack of lack of lack of
conflict conflict conflict conflict conflict conflict
a) during the relaxation period____________________________
h) during the reading of instructions.
c) during the discrimination of lengths of lines_
d) during the performance of the first task_____
e) during the performance of the second task_
f) at the end of the performance of the above two tasks____
g) right now______________________________________________
If you experienced conflict, at what point, a through g, 
did it:
1) begin to subside
2) completely subside_____________________________________





Christenson, Guilford, Merrifield, and Wilson 
NAME DATE
In this test you will he asked to consider some common ob­
jects. Each object has a common use which will be stated.
You are to list as many as six other uses for which the object 
or parts of the object could serve.
EXAMPLE:
Given: A NEWSPAPER (used for reading). You might think
of the following other uses for a newspaper -
a. start a fire__________________________________________
b. wrap garbage_________________________________________
c. swat flies
d. stuffing to pack boxes
e. line drawers or shelves
f. make up a kidnap note
Notice that all of the uses listed are different from each 
other and different from the primary use of a newspaper. Each 
acceptable use must be different from others and from the com­
mon use.
Do not spend too much time on any one item. Write down 
those uses that occur to you and go on to the others in the 
same part. You may return to the incomplete items in a part 
if the time for that part permits.
There are three parts to this test, with three items per 
part. You will have 1| minutes for each part.
If you have any questions, ask them now.
STOP HERE. WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
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PART I
List as many as six possible uses for each of the following 
objects:
1. SHOE (used as footwear)
2. BUTTON (used to fasten things)
3. EEÏ (used to open a lock)
PART II
List as many as six possible uses for each of the following 
objects:
Ij.. CHAIR (used for sitting)
5. WATCH (used for telling time)
6. SAFETY PIN (used for fastening)
PART III
List as many as six possible uses for each of the following 
objects:
7* WOODEN PENCIL (used for writing)
8. AUTOMOBILE TIRE (used on the wheel of an automobile)
9. EYEGLASS (used to improve vision)




Christensen, Merrifield, and Guilford
N A M E __________________________________ DATE_____
This is a test of your ability tothink of a large number 
of ideas in connection with a new and unusual situation.
Look at a sample item.
SAMPLE ITEM:
What would be the results if people no longer needed or 
wanted sleep?
SAMPLE RESULTS:
1. Get more work done________________________________
2. Alarm clocks not necessary________________________
3. Wo need for lullaby song books____________________




Of course, there are many more possible results that could 
have been written.
There will be ten (10) different situations somewhat like 
the one above, each one on a separate page. Four examples will 
be included for each item. You will be given.one minute on 
each page to write down other possible results. Write as many 
different consequences or probable sentences as possible. Your 
score will be the total number of different consequences that 
you write down in the time given you.
Are there any questions?
STOP HERB. WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
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LIST AS MA.NY DIFFERENT 
CONSEQCJENGES AS YOU CAN.
What would be the results If none of us needed food, any 
more in order to live?
a. No need for farmers
b. No plates, knives, and forks
c. No grocers
d. Save time
What would be the results if humans lost their group feel­
ing to the extent that they all preferred to live alone?
a. No more marriages
b. Population decline
c. More hermit s
d. No more cities
What would be the results if the entire United States west 
of the Mississippi became an arid desert?
a. Shortage of water
b. People would move Bast
c. Food shortage
d. Trees would die
What would be the results if everyone suddenly lost the 
sense of balance, and were unable to stay in the upright po­
sition for more than a moment ?
a. People would fall down
b. Gould not walk
c. Many accidents
d. Confusion
What would be the results if all the people in the world 
lost the ability to reproduce offspring?
a. Race would die out
b. No more babies
c. No more baby doctors
d. No more diapers, toys, etc.
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What would be the results if it appeared certain that with­
in three months the entire surface of the earth would be cov­
ered with water, except for a few of the highest mountain peaks?
a. Everyone will move to mountain peaks
b. Increased sale of boats
c. Business failure
d. Panic
What would be the results if everyone suddenly lost the 
ability to read and write?
a. No newspapers or magazines
b. No libraries
c. No mail or letters
d. TV sales increase
What would be the results if human life continued on earth 
without death?
a. Overpopulation
b. More old people
c. Housing shortage
d. No more funerals
What would be the results if the force of gravity were sud­
denly cut in half?
a. Jump higher
b. More accidents
c. Less effort to walk
d. Easier to lift things
What would be the results if suddenly no one could use arms 
or hands?
a. Learn to use feet more
b. No need for gloves
c. Clothing would be changed
d. Couldn't drive cars
APPENDIX D. RAW DATA FOR CONTROL SUBJECTS
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RAW DATA FOR CONTROL SUBJECTS









1 16 25 1.93 0 2 25 9 23
2 19 22 2.00 2 1 17 5 23
3 16 23 2.00 O' 1 26 8 32
k 19 20 1.93 1 0 20 2 24
5 19 24 2.07 1 3 21 9 30
6 19 22 2.00 0 0 15 3 18
7 20 18 1.93 3 3 21 5 28
6 19 24 2.00 0 1 29 9 24
9 18 24 2.07 2 0 16 3 28
10 19 23 1.94 2 2 25 8 26
11 19 20 2.00 6 3 22 1 19
12 18 24 2.06 0 5 12 10 16
13 18 25 1.94 2 3 19 8 25
Ik 19 18 2.06 2 0. 11 1 18
IS 19 21 2,00 1 1 24 8 26
16 19 18 2.00 6 0 14 2 23
17 18 21 1.94 6 1 15 5 30
16 19 20 2.07 2 1 30 4 33
19 18 21 2.07 3 0 21 2 29
20 19 20 2.07 2 1 12 4 23
APPENDIX E. RAW DATA FOR EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
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RAW DATA FOR EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS









1 18 23 2.06 5 1 27 9 37
2 19 20 2.00 4 2 36 10 40
3 19 23 1.93 0 2 17 7 34
h 19 23 2.07 1 1 14 3 29
5 18 2$ 1.94 5 3 16 10 34
6 18 22 1.94 3 3 35 8 20
7 19 18 1.93 3 1 25 9 38
8 19 22 1.94 10 0 16 1 28
9 18 2lt 2.00 0 0 11 2 16
10 19 18 2.07 1 0 7 2 16
11 18 2k 2.07 1 1 23 4 23
12 19 20 2.07 6 3 16 4 27
13 19 23 1.93 1 1 27 9 28
lit 18 18 2.00 5 4 18 3 45
1^ 19 22 2.07 1 1 24 5 32
16 19 23 2.00 0 1 27 7 26
17 19 21 2.00 3 0 26 3 34
18 18 22 2.00 1 0 30 14 29
19 19 22 2.06 2 5 24 5 33
20 19 19 2.00 4 2 23 4 32
